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 ABSTRACT 
 
An Analysis of Perceived Faculty and Staff Computing Behaviors that Protect or Expose Them 
or Others to Information Security Attacks 
by 
Chiwaraidzo Judith Nyabando  
 
A mixed-methods study, conducted in 2007-2008, designed to quantify and assess behaviors that 
either protect or expose data at academic institutions to information security attacks. This study 
focused on computing practices at two academic institutions: East Tennessee State University 
and Milligan College. Interviews with six information technology professionals and online 
surveys were used to assess faculty and staff members’ awareness and practice of safe computing 
behaviors. The constant comparison method was used to analyze qualitative data. Descriptive 
statistics and univariate and multivariate analysis of variance techniques were used to analyze the 
quantitative data.   
 
Overall, the analyses indicated that the faculty and staff members at these institutions were 
equally aware of information security issues and practices and tended to practice safe computing 
behaviors—though apparently at a level that was less than commensurate with their awareness of 
these behaviors. Raised awareness correlated with safe computing behaviors, as did computer 
usage: those who had used computers for more than 20 years appeared to be more aware of safe 
practice than those who had used computers for 20 years or less. Password management emerged 
as a major challenge for the participants. They were also concerned with phishing emails and 
they tended not to be aware of FERPA regulations.   
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Computer technology has allowed information to be shared to an unprecedented degree at 
a cost of making that information more susceptible to attack. In particular, computer networks 
like the Internet provide convenient access to information as well as a convenient point of attack 
for service disruption and information theft (Conklin, White, Cothren, Williams, & Davis, 2004). 
Colleges and universities are at special risk for information theft. A study of 36 colleges 
and universities in the United States found that those institutions had suffered 319 attacks on 
their information resources (Young, 2005).  In a study conducted in 2006 on information security 
in higher education, 124 of 182 participants indicated that their institutions had experienced at 
least one information security breach in 2005 (CDW Government). In June 2003 a computer 
virus at Stanford University broadcasted confidential employee salary and bonus information to 
about 35,000 Stanford users (Kvavik et al., 2003). In February 2003, an intruder accessed names 
and social security numbers of 59,000 students, faculty, and staff at the University of Texas at 
Austin (Kvavik et al.). 
Although developers and researchers have provided ways to secure computer networks, 
authorized users can engage in practices that expose their host systems to attack. Bishop (2005) 
said “the heart of any security system is people” (p. 19). Users who are uninformed about and 
indifferent to information security problems tend to act in ways that increase the risk of security 
breaches and attacks, while users who are aware of these problems can, by implementing 
protective measures, help to prevent their occurrence.  
 
Statement of the Problem  
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Colleges and universities are entrusted with confidential information about their students, 
alumni, employees, and other clients. Institutions of higher education must protect this 
information because the cost of insecurity can be very high (Foster, 2004). As a part of this 
 
 
 obligation, colleges and universities must continually assess their security status.  
This study was undertaken in order to further the academic community’s understanding 
of the potential risks to information security posed by employees of academic institutions. To 
this end, it sought to assess how faculty and staff at two institutions of higher learning—a public 
regional university (East Tennessee State University (ETSU)) and a private college (Milligan 
College)—do standard, computer-related tasks that impact data security: i.e. manage passwords, 
dispose of data storage devices and documents, back-up data, comply with the Family Education 
Records and Privacy Act (FERPA), contend with malware, and manage phishing e-mails. It was 
designed to assess faculty and staff members’ awareness of information security practice as well 
as their behaviors.  
 
Research Questions 
For the purpose of this study, these goals were framed in terms of the following five 
research questions: 
1. What are the computing behaviors of faculty and staff members that can either protect or 
expose them or others to information security attacks as observed by information 
technology professionals?  
2. What are the faculty and staff members’ attitudes toward the role they play in securing 
computer systems as reported by the faculty and staff members?  
3. What are the faculty and staff members computing behaviors reported by the faculty and 
staff members that either protect or expose them or others to information security attacks?  
4. In what ways, if any, do attitudes towards information security, awareness of information 
security issues, and awareness of information security policies make a difference in how 
faculty and staff members use information technology? 
5. What differences, if any, exist in information security awareness and practice among 
faculty and staff members with different demographic characteristics? 
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 Significance of the Study 
Smith (2004) states that risk assessment is the first step in creating an information 
security policy. Identifying faculty and staff computing behaviors that render academic 
institutions either more or less vulnerable to information security attacks and assessing the 
prevalence of these computing behaviors is a reasonable first step towards helping institutions 
like ETSU and Milligan College to evaluate their training programs and user policies in order to 
protect their information resources and its people from preventable attacks.  
 
Delimitations and Limitations 
 The study was delimited to the faculty and staff at ETSU and Milligan. No attempt was 
made to determine the study’s external validity: i.e. the extent to which its findings can be 
generalized to other institutions of higher education. Even so, it is hoped that these findings can 
help other institutions assess their information security needs and to develop effective programs 
for educating faculty and staff members on how to protect their information and that of their 
institution.  
In order to address possible biases resulting from the author’s concerns about information 
security, the study was designed to determine how different kinds of practices, both good and 
bad, affect institutional security in positive as well as negative ways.  
 
Definition and Explanation of Terms  
 For the purpose of this study the following definitions will apply: 
A computer system includes hardware, software, policies and procedures (Bishop, 2005). 
Authorized users are people who have authorized access to certain information and 
resources (Conklin et al., 2004). 
Dumpster diving occurs when an intruder searches trash for confidential information 
(Conklin et al., 2004) such as social security numbers and passwords.  
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Information security is the deliberate use of policies and practices to ensure the 
 
 
 confidentiality, integrity, availability, and proper use of information and information resources, 
as well as individual accountability for the use of those resources (Bishop, 2005; Conklin et al., 
2004).   
Information confidentiality refers to the secrecy of information (Bishop, 2005). Only 
individuals authorized to view certain information should have access to that information.  
Information integrity refers to the trustworthiness of information (Bishop, 2005). “It is 
the accuracy, consistency and reliability of the information content, processes and systems” 
(“Information Integrity Defined”, n.d.).  
Information availability is the assurance that information is available and accessible when 
an authorized user needs to access it (Conklin et al., 2004). It is the assurance that an authorized 
user can access information without undue interruption.  
Information nonrepudiation refers to the ability to verify that information was sent by the 
intended sender and received by the intended receiver; such that the sender cannot refuse having 
sent the information and the receiver cannot refuse having received the information (Conklin et 
al., 2004).  Nonrepudiation equates to holding individuals accountable for their use of 
information and information resources (Conklin et al.). 
Intruders, hackers, and unauthorized users are people who seek to gain access to 
information and resources they are not authorized to access (Conklin et al., 2004). 
USB flash drive, also known as JumpDrive, is a removable data storage device that has a 
universal serial bus (USB) connector (Wikipedia, n.d.). It uses flash memory technology for 
general data storage and transfer (Wikipedia).  
Malicious code or malware is software that is designed for a malevolent purpose 
(Conklin et al., 2004).  Viruses, worms, Trojan horses, keystroke loggers, and spyware are 
examples of malware.  
Social engineering is when an intruder manipulates an authorized user into disclosing 
confidential information (Conklin et al., 2004) such as a username or a password.  
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Phishing is a form of social engineering that involves “an attempt by a third party to 
 
 
 solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or organization, usually for financial 
gain” (Symantec, 2007, p 64).  Phishing typically involves deception in the form of the attacker’s 
masquerading as a legitimate entity who is seeking this information for supposedly legitimate 
purposes. 
Shoulder surfing is when an intruder observes an authorized user as the user enters 
confidential information or observe the user’s actions in order to get confidential information 
(Conklin et al., 2004).  
Spoofing is when an entity assumes the identity of another, usually a trusted entity. 
(Conklin et al., 2004).  
Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in computer systems that can be exploited by 
unauthorized users to gain access to the computer systems (Canavan, 2001). They are a result of 
flaws in the design, implementation, or operation of a computer system (Bishop, 2005).  
 
Overview of the Study 
The balance of this study is organized into four chapters. Chapter 2 reviews relevant 
work and background material, including the history of information security issues, information 
security, information security best practices and human and organizational behavior. The 
remaining three chapters present the study’s methodology; data; and findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Chapter 2 reviews related literature on information security. Bishop lists three goals for 
information security: the prevention of attacks and unauthorized access to information; the 
detection of actual intrusions, and the maintenance of business continuity in the face of attacks, 
including recovery from those attacks (2005). 
The review, which is organized into eight sections, begins with a discussion of 
information security issues from the 1960s to the present. The next three sections present 
theories of human behavior in relation to information technology, organizational culture issues in 
relation to information security, and information security attacks through an authorized user. The 
following three sections discuss the higher education computing environment, information 
security incidents involving institutions of higher education, and information security policies of 
ETSU and Milligan College, the institutions under study. The last section discusses best 
practices in information security. 
 
Information Security from 1960 to the Present 
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From the early 1960s through the mid-1980s, information security efforts focused 
primarily on securing data on individual computer systems.  Most of these systems were 
mainframes, which are very large and expensive computers, and minicomputers, which were 
midrange between mainframes and personal computers (Canavan, 2001). Most of these 
computers were not connected to a network. Data were processed and stored on a central 
computer and users interfaced with the computer through terminals (Bosworth & Jacobson, 
2002). The terminals were not used to download and save data. The computers were accessible 
only to trained technicians (Bosworth & Jacobson). They were not available to the general 
public. Security concerns during this period focused on securing physical access to computers 
and securing operating systems (Canavan).   
 
 
 The first major computer network, the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
(ARPANET), was introduced in 1969 (Bosworth & Jacobson, 2002). The ARPANET, which 
was sponsored by the Department of Defense, connected research computers at University of 
California at Los Angeles, University of California at Santa Barbara, Stanford Research Institute, 
and University of Utah. This network was the predecessor to the Internet.  
The ARPANET was the proving ground for TCP/IP, a set of procedures and standards 
that support reliable communication between heterogeneous computers (Canavan, 2001). 
TCP/IP, like the Internet, was made available to the public during the 1970s and 1980s 
(Canavan). These developments, along with the introduction of personal computers, affordable 
local area networking, and the development of new applications, introduced a new era of 
information technology. These technologies linked computer networks to the outside world. 
Programs could be executed on local computers, data could be transferred from one computer to 
another, and data could be stored on portable devices such as disks (Bosworth & Jacobson, 
2002).  Computer costs decreased and computers became available to the general public.  
The popularization of computing also introduced a new wave of information security 
concerns. The severity of preexisting problems such as software vulnerabilities and malware was 
exacerbated by exposing systems to the Internet. New issues such as copyright infringement, 
online fraud, and identity theft emerged (Bosworth & Jacobson, 2002). Computer users grew 
from trained technicians to include non-technical people. The number of intruders also increased. 
In response to these threats, the literature on best practices in information security has broadened 
to encompass organizational and human factors, networks, and networking technologies (Trcek, 
Trobec, Pavesic, & Tasic, 2007).  
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The earliest documented attack on a computer network occurred in 1970, when an 
unknown individual released the Creeper virus onto the ARPANET (Elliott, Young, Collins, 
Frawley, & Temares, 1991).  That virus, though harmless, spread through modems from one 
computer to another and displayed on the infected computers the message ‘I’M THE CREEPER: 
CATCH ME IF YOU CAN’ (Wikipedia, n.d.).  
 
 
 The first major attack on a computer network was the Morris worm of 1988. The worm 
was released by Robert T. Morris, a graduate student at Cornell University and the son of the 
former chief scientist at the National Computer Center, a branch of the National Security Agency 
(Rosenberg, 2004). The worm shut down about 6,000 computer systems by reproducing so 
rapidly that the computers had no time left to do any useful work (Conklin et al., 2004). That 
attack caused an estimated damage of about $100 million dollars (Conklin et al.).  
 Major attacks involving computer networks became more common following the Morris 
worm.  These attacks have included attacks on networks, like the Melissa virus ($80 million in 
damages), the Love Letter worm ($10 million), and the Slammer worm of 2003 (Conklin et al., 
2004). The Slammer worm infected over 120, 000 computers within the first 24 hours of its 
release, causing networks to go down and creating problems with ATMs and airline flights 
(Conklin et al.). At the University of Texas at Austin, 5,000 computers were infected by 
Slammer (Kvavik et al., 2003).  Attacks on computers have also included unauthorized break-ins 
to computer systems like the Citibank and Vladimir Levin incident, wherein Levin stole $10 
million by hacking Citibank’s cash management system (Conklin et al.).  
 Studies by Symantec and others have indicated that network-based threats continue to 
challenge information security. Over a course of over 10 years that ended December 2006, 
Symantec (2007) identified about 20,000 system vulnerabilities. They also reported a 12% 
increase in vulnerabilities between July and December 2006 (Symantec). During the last half of 
2006, their Symantec Probe Network received an average of 904 unique phishing messages per 
day. In addition, 66% percent of the top 50 malicious codes reported to Symantec between July 
2006 and December 2006 were designed to expose confidential information.  
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Fifty-four percent of identity-theft-related attacks reported between July 2006 and 
December 2006 involved theft or loss of computers and storage devices (Symantec, 2007).  A 
May 2006 incident involving a stolen U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) illustrates the 
potential severity of this risk. The VA discovered that a laptop computer that contained insurance 
claim information for millions of VA patients had been stolen from the home of one of its 
 
 
 employees (“Latest Information”, n.d.). The data on the laptop included patient names, dates of 
birth, and social security numbers (“Latest Information”).  
Another issue that is currently of concern is unprotected wireless networks. Most home 
and public wireless access points are not protected, making it easier for intruders to intercept and 
access wireless communications (Barile, 2006). Most authorized users are not aware of the need 
to protect their wireless networks or how to protect them (Barile).  
Analyses of information security incidents show that people attack computers for 
different reasons.  Some people attack systems in order to assert their self-proclaimed right to 
access any information they want (Rosenberg, 2004).  These individuals argue that 
[t]he very concept of secret information is offensive and that if it were not collected, there 
would be no need to protect it. Thus, they claim that their role must be to “liberate” the 
data, to defeat the notion of secure systems, and thereby to inhibit open-ended collection 
of information (Rosenberg, p 449).         
Others, known as script kiddies, hack for the thrill of doing so. Script kiddies lack the 
technological skills to develop harmful programs or discover new vulnerabilities but are skilled 
enough to download and release harmful programs (Conklin et al., 2004). At the other end of the 
thrill-seeking spectrum one finds elite hackers: people who discover vulnerabilities and write 
harmful programs to manipulate them (Conklin et al.).   
Still others, criminal groups and terrorists, are usually organized and supported by 
funding (Conklin et al., 2004). They are involved in criminal activities such as extortion, theft, 
forgery, fraud, and terrorism (Conklin et al.).       
 
Human Behavior and Information Technology 
 20  
 Theories have been developed to explain human behavior towards technology. One such 
theory, Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), asserts that behavior results from intentions that are 
produced by a person’s attitude toward that behavior and related subjective norms (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975). A person’s attitude towards a behavior is a result of the person’s beliefs about the 
 
 
 behavior. Subjective norms are influences from other people in the person’s social environment 
(Fishbein & Ajzen).  
A theory more specific to information technology is the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM) (Davis, 1986). Davis, who adapted TAM from TRA, identified and specified two 
attitudes that influence user technology acceptance: perceived usefulness and perceived ease of 
use. Perceived usefulness has a greater influence than perceived ease of use because users are 
willing to accept a useful technology even though it may be a little difficult to use (Davis, 1989). 
Perceptions may change with time and perceived ease of use may increase as technologies 
become more widely used (as cited in Dillon & Morris, 1996). 
Studies that validate TRA and TAM include Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw’s comparative 
study of TAM and TRA (1989), Taylor and Todd’s comparative study of IT usage by 
experienced and inexperienced users (1995), and Shih’s user e-shopping acceptance study 
(2004). 
 
Organizational Culture 
Information security management, according to Anderson (2001), is an iterative process: 
a cycle of incidents and responses, including investitures in preventative measures (Anderson). 
Anderson argues that organizations can become complacent over time, reacting only when an 
incident occurs. 
 Aytes and Connolly (2004) attempted to document student computing behaviors at two 
large U.S. universities. Most participants indicated that they were aware of and knew how to 
protect themselves from information security problems. For example 69% indicated that they 
knew how to protect themselves against viruses and 50% indicated that they knew how to protect 
their financial information.  However, 47% of those participants also indicated that they had 
never received any educational information about information security. Of those who had 
received information, it was from friends and colleagues and personal experience. 
 21  
 Some studies have shown that authorized users are becoming more aware of information 
 
 
 security threats and how to protect themselves because of the publicity given to information 
security incidents (Furnell, 2005). Most users have heard of viruses, worms, spyware, and 
phishing. This awareness helps users understand the importance of securing information systems 
(Furnell).   
Additionally, Aytes and Connolly (2004) and Bishop (2005) state that users and 
organizations could be overconfident about security. Security policies could be implemented 
incorrectly, thereby giving a false sense of security (Bishop). Aytes and Connolly found that 
users who were aware of potential information security threats routinely thought that they were 
least likely to experience those attack themselves.  
       
Avenues of Attack Through an Authorized User 
Some security breaches involve deliberate theft or misuse of information resources by 
authorized users. This study, however, focuses on incidents where attackers exploit 
vulnerabilities that are created unintentionally by authorized users. Common avenues of attack 
through authorized users include weak passwords, shoulder surfing, dumpster diving, file 
sharing, social engineering, failure to log off after using a computer, and failure to backup files 
(Conklin et al., 2004).  
Weak passwords are passwords that are too short, easy to guess, or never changed 
(Canavan, 2001). In 2003 the University of Pennsylvania identified weak passwords to systems 
as its major security problem (Foster, 2004). Users usually select passwords they can easily 
remember. The problem with many easy-to-remember passwords is that they can easily be 
reconstructed (Conklin et al., 2004). 
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Shoulder surfing involves the use of visual surveillance to obtain information to which a 
person is not entitled.  Typically, the intruder positions herself or himself in such a way that an 
authorized user can be observed entering a password or other sensitive content (Conklin et al., 
2004). Additionally, computer hardware devices emit electromagnetic radiation as they 
communicate with other peripheral devices (Stewart, Tittel, & Chapple, 2005).  These 
 
 
 emanations can be intercepted by intruders to capture whatever is displayed on a monitor or 
typed on a keyboard (Stewart et al.).   
 Users routinely share files with one another on a daily basis, using e-mail attachments 
and portable storage devices such as flash drives. This sharing enables malware to be distributed 
through computer networks easily.  
Social engineering is the manipulation of authorized users to disclose privileged 
information. According to Conklin et al. (2004), social engineers often exploit people’s desire to 
help others. A classic example of a social engineer is Kevin Mitnick, who used impersonation to 
obtain confidential information such as passwords to accounts and files and names of key 
security officials (as cited in Rosenberg, 2004). He used this information to penetrate telephone 
company systems, steal files, and alter and move confidential files (Rosenberg). Mitnick hacked 
information systems from about 1989 to 1999, when he was eventually arrested (Rosenberg). 
Mitnick became a security consultant upon completing his sentence (as cited in Rosenberg).  
Failure to log off after using a system provides an easy access to intruders. Failure to 
backup files is also a threat because if files become corrupted or are destroyed the information 
stored will be completely lost.  
 
The Higher Education Computing Environment  
 Universities and colleges collect, store, and transact large amounts of private information 
about their students, employees, prospective students, alumni, and others connected to the 
institutions (Cate, 2006). The information includes student records, financial records, health 
records, academic records (Cate), and intellectual property.  Institutions of higher education must 
also comply with Federal and State privacy and data protection laws. 
 
Technology 
 23  
A report compiled by Hawkins and Rudy (2006) for EDUCAUSE found that most of the 
933 reporting colleges and universities used electronic technologies for data management.  This 
 
 
 included course management systems such as Blackboard and multimedia classrooms with 
technologies such as wired Internet access, LCD projectors, computers, and smart boards.  Most 
of the 204 institutions that participated in a study by Caruso (2006) had acceptable use polices 
for technology.  Most institutions used VPN for remote network access (Caruso; Hawkins & 
Rudy).  Most campuses were providing wireless Internet access (Hawkins & Rudy). Most 
employees had university e-mail accounts (Hawkins & Rudy).  
 
Federal and State laws 
  The laws with which educational institutions need to comply include FERPA; the 
Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA); the Electronics Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA); the Patriot Act (Corkin et al, 2004); the Technology, Education, and 
Copyright Harmonization Act (TEACH); and various state laws that govern information 
technology in higher education (Salomon, Cassart, & Thibeau, 2003).  
 FERPA is a federal law established to protect the privacy of student records (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2006). FERPA applies to educational institutions that receive federal 
funds. Under FERPA, educational institutions must obtain written permission from the student or 
the parent before release any information in a student record. However, educational institutions 
can release directory information such as names, addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of 
birth without student or parental consent (U.S. Department of Education).  
Virtually all educational institutions store some, if not all, student records in electronic 
form. This practice dramatically increases the amount of data covered by FERPA (Salomon, 
Cassat, & Thibeau, 2003). Institutions of higher education should have guidelines for how and 
where to store student information and how to secure this information such that only authorized 
users can view it. They also need to have FERPA-compliant procedures for processing student or 
parental requests for student records. Faculty, staff, students, and parents need to be informed 
about these procedures.  
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 HIPAA was established to protect the privacy rights of patients. HIPPA standardizes the 
 
 
 transmission of electronic patient records, requires health providers to adopt written privacy 
policies and procedures that govern access to patient information, and requires the training of 
employees in protecting patient information privacy and the designation of a specific person(s) 
for ensuring that policies and procedures are followed in compliance with the law (Salomon et 
al., 2003). In 2000 the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services mandated that 
consumers receive written notices of the information practices of health care providers and other 
covered entities under HIPAA (Salomon et al.). These entities include institutions of higher 
education that are affiliated with health care providers (Salomon et al.).  
 The ECPA prohibits unauthorized use or interception of contents of any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication (Salomon et al, 2003). The law was established to protect workplace 
privacy and discourage unauthorized access to electronic resources (Corkin et al, 2004). ECPA 
prohibits employers and other organizations from monitoring computer usage without users’ 
consent (Corkin et al). However, organizations have a right to protect their resources and in 
many cases that includes monitoring the activities of those using their networks. For this reason 
many organizations issue warnings that a user, by accessing these resources, gives the 
organization permission to monitor the user’s activities on the organization’s network (Corkin et 
al).  
The PATRIOT Act amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), FEPA, and 
ECPA among others (Jaeger, McClure, Bertot, & Snead, 2004). The Act, passed in the wake of 
9/11 terrorist attacks, gives the FBI and other law enforcement agencies more latitude in 
conducting investigations.  
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At least two provisions of the PATRIOT Act affect institutions of higher education. The 
first allows law enforcement agents to request any library records of library patrons suspected of 
terrorist activities without the patrons’ knowledge or consent (Jaeger et al, 2004). The second 
provision requires colleges and universities to submit personal information for all international 
students enrolled at their institutions to the Student Exchange and Visitor Information System 
(SEVIS) (Holub, 2003). SEVIS is a database of information on all international students enrolled 
 
 
 in United States colleges and universities (Holub).  
The TEACH Act of November 2002 relaxes copyright laws in ways that enable 
accredited not-for-profit educational institutions and government bodies to use copyright-
protected materials in distance education (Holub, 2003). Before TEACH was enacted it was 
difficult for instructors and students to share materials through the Internet and other digital 
media without violating copyright laws (Crews, 2006).  TEACH allows instructors and students 
to share portions, not full text or lengthy copyrighted materials, through instructional technology 
within the context of a course (Crews).  
TEACH enables educational institutions to establish copyright polices and guidelines 
regarding distance education at the institutions (Crews, 2006). The policies define standards for 
instructors to follow when using copyright materials. TEACH also makes institutions responsible 
for bringing awareness of the law and the guidelines to their faculty, student, and staff (Crews). 
Technology administrators on colleges and universities need to help ensure that access to these 
copyrighted materials is limited to students enrolled in that particular class only.   
 State authorities have established laws that affect the management of information 
resources by colleges and universities.  These include data-breach disclosure laws that require 
victims to be notified if their private information is disclosed to unauthorized users (Foster, 
2005).   
 
Incidents on University Campuses 
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 According to Kvavik et al. (2003), large institutions and doctoral institutions report far 
more attacks on their information resources than smaller institutions. For example, in June 2003 
a computer virus at Stanford University broadcast confidential employee salary and bonus 
information to about 35,000 users at the university (Kvavik et al.). In February 2003, an intruder 
accessed names and social security numbers of 59,000 University of Texas at Austin students, 
faculty, and staff (Kvavik et al.). The University of Pennsylvania spent $287,000 in staff time to 
repair the damage incurred by the Blaster worm in 2003 (Foster, 2004).  On December 12, 2006, 
 
 
 UCLA announced that an intruder, over the course of a year, had accessed a database that has 
personal information about UCLA students (current and former), faculty, and staff (UCLA, 
2006). It is believed that the intruder had access to information on about 800,000 people.  
About 30% of the institutions that Kvavik et al. (2003) surveyed had awareness programs 
on information security. Kvalik et al. found that the number of information security breaches 
increased as the number of information technology devices increased and as the number of users 
increased.  In another survey of information technology officials, 41% of study participants 
reported that intruders had penetrated their systems during the previous year (Foster, 2004). 
According to Symantec (2007), the education sector accounted for 20% of all reported data 
breaches that could lead to identity theft during the July 2006 to December 2006 period, second 
only to the government sector, which experienced 25% of the breaches.  
Studies by Ashe (2004) and Simons (2005) argue that higher education institutions make 
easy targets for attacks. Ashe and Simons attribute these vulnerabilities to a combination of 
decentralized information systems, a constant flow of new technologies, and a relative lack of 
personnel resources and administrative support to secure their information resources. Control 
over academic systems tends to be decentralized due to individual academic entities preferring to 
have control over resources to allow for an unrestricted learning environment. These systems are 
sometimes managed by users who have limited knowledge about how to set up and use the 
systems in a correct and secure manner. For example, Simons reported that 15 of the 
administrative accounts in the study had weak passwords or no passwords at all. This opens the 
door for attacks. Limited resources and limited administrative support presents a challenge in 
accounting for all available information resources and in eradicating known vulnerabilities 
(Ashe; Simons).    
 
Information Security Policies at Institutions under Study 
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ETSU publishes two documents that define policies for using information technology 
resources. The first, the Information Technology Code of Ethics (“Information Technology Code 
 
 
 of Ethics”, 2006), presents overall guidelines for faculty and staff usage.  The second, ETSU’s 
Acceptable Use Policy, mainly covers Internet use and publishing websites (“Acceptable Use 
Policy", 2000). Both documents specify the rights and responsibilities of persons authorized to 
access information technology resources. Both documents state that users are accountable for 
any activities that occur in his or her computer account, knowingly or unknowingly.  
 ETSU maintains information about virus protection and virus protection resources as well 
as online security awareness training (“Office of Information Technology”, n.d.). This training is 
only for authorized ETSU users. ETSU’s OIT also has an alerts section on its website where 
notices and alerts regarding information security are posted and updated regularly. 
Milligan College’s Computer Use Policy gives guidelines for computer use at Milligan 
College. The policy is intended for all faculty, staff, and students who use Milligan’s computing 
resources (“Milligan College Computer Use Policy”, n.d.). The policy describes an authorized 
user’s responsibilities, gives examples of unacceptable actions, and describes the consequences 
of violating the policy’s requirements.  
Milligan College’s information technology office maintains other resources on computer 
use for Milligan’s faculty. These include instructions on how to back-up files and how to 
password-protect a computer when not in use, as well as links to sites for downloading anti-
spyware software (“Information Technology”, n.d.).  
 
Best Practices 
  An information security policy is a recommended starting point for managing 
information security (Anderson, 2001; Bishop, 2005; Conklin et al., 2004). Thomson and Solms 
(2005) said that a policy’s purpose “is to influence and determine decisions, actions and other 
issues, by specifying what behavior is acceptable and what behavior is unacceptable” (p. 71). A 
well-written policy can guide users in using the organization’s resources securely. It should also 
outline users’ responsibilities and give guidelines for acceptable use of resources.  
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 Conklin et al. (2004) view policy implementation as a four-step process. In the first, 
 
 
 planning step, an organization identifies its assets and creates policies for managing risks to 
those assets (Smith, 2004). Next, the organization implements the policies, educating its users 
about the policies’ requirements. The implementation should then be monitored and, finally, 
evaluated for effectiveness. Based on the evaluation’s results, the policies can be adjusted, 
restarting the cycle. This is a continuous process because organizations and the environment 
surrounding them are always changing, and new threats continue to come.  
 Information security policies can include an acceptable use policy, an Internet usage 
policy, an e-mail usage policy, a disposal policy, a password policy, and anti-social engineering 
guidelines (Conklin et al., 2004).  
 An acceptable use policy outlines the proper use of an organization’s information 
technology resources.  It also outlines what a user may and may not do while using these 
resources.  
 The Internet usage policy specifically outlines what an organization’s users may and may 
not do on the Internet while using the organization’s resources. It should also specify procedures 
for posting materials on the Internet.   
 Related to the Internet usage policy is the e-mail usage policy. An e-mail usage policy 
explains what employees are allowed to send using the organization’s e-mail resources. 
Employees should be aware that e-mail messages sent over the Internet, unless encrypted, can be 
read by anyone who intercepts the messages.  
 According to Conklin et al. (2004) intruders search for confidential information in 
discarded records and electronic media, including documents, letters, scratch paper, and old hard 
drives (Conklin et al.). These vulnerabilities should be addressed with polices for secure disposal 
of sensitive materials. Documents should be shredded into small pieces or should be burned to 
prevent reconstruction of information (Kissel, Scholl, Skolochenko, & Li, 2006). Data on 
unwanted electronic storage devices should be magnetically destroyed and the devices should be 
pulverized (Kissel, et al.).  
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 A password management policy specifies guidelines for managing passwords. These 
 
 
 include policies for what passwords can be selected, how often passwords must be changed, and 
how to help users recover from forgotten passwords.   
Passwords are the most widely used technique of verifying user identity (Canavan, 2001). 
Strong password policies—policies that require users to choose hard-to-guess passwords—are 
important for protecting systems against unauthorized access.  The use of personal data as a 
password should be discouraged because anyone who can discover a user’s personal information 
could guess these passwords (Conklin et al.).  Examples of bad passwords based on personal data 
include birthdays, social security numbers, and names of relatives.   
The characters that make up a user’s password can also affect a password’s strength. 
Conklin et al. (2004) also recommend against the use of letters-only passwords, as being too easy 
to guess. Various authorities recommend selecting passwords that are a combination of letters, 
numbers, and punctuation marks (Anderson, 2001; Canavan, 2001; Conklin et al.). Canavan also 
suggests that a password be changed every 45 days. 
 Three kinds of strategies have been described for ensuring the use of strong passwords. 
The first, which assigns the user a preselected, system-generated password, tends to produce 
passwords that are easier to forget, not being user-selected (Canavan, 2001). The second allows 
the user to select the password but checks for the password strength during password selection. 
The third, which postpones the check of password strength until some later time, allows for a 
more thorough check of password strength, at a cost of delayed feedback (Anderson, 2001). The 
last two strategies should require the user to choose a new password if the user’s password is 
discovered (Anderson).  
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 Kevin Mitnick has suggested five guidelines for combating social engineering attacks (as 
cited in Rosenberg, 2004). Always verify the identity of the person requesting confidential 
information. Verify that the requester is authorized to have the information. Avoid participating 
in telephone surveys because social engineers can pose as suppliers needing information about 
their customers. Avoid opening and replying to phishing e-mails—doing so can open a door for 
hackers and malicious code. Finally, avoid posting confidential information in plain view.  
 
 
 Effective Information Security for Higher Education Institutions 
 Information security policies should be formulated in accordance with an organization’s 
business needs and practices. Some policies must be more restrictive than others. Higher 
education institutions need to consider academic freedom when developing and implementing 
information security policies (Elliot et al, 1991).  Where possible, policies should be permissive 
enough to support the full exercise of academic freedom.   
 Camp, DeBlouis, and the Educause Current Issues Committee (2007) recommend that 
colleges and universities observe the following eight guidelines for information security: 
1. Maintain privacy and security policies that (a) cover more than what is required by law, 
(b) are enforced consistently throughout the institution, (c) are reviewed and analyzed 
regularly. 
2. Maintain a security incident response plan. 
3. Maintain a plan to keep up with changes in threats and federal and state laws.  
4. Make security a funding priority. 
5. Designate a dedicated team for dealing with IT security. 
6. Do a comprehensive risk assessment regularly.  
7. Maintain IT security awareness and training program. 
8. Maintain the appropriate infrastructure to implement protective measures. 
 Cate (2006) suggests that colleges and universities first commit to protecting private 
information, then reconsider the reasons for collecting the information they collect and the 
implications of collecting that information. This process should entail an assessment of the 
information collected and the reasons for collecting it, the risks associated with collecting it, and 
security measures that will be implemented to protect it. It should also provide people served by 
the institutions an opportunity to provide consent to collect the information. 
 
Summary 
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The literature on information security indicates that information security issues continue 
 
 
 to challenge organizations including institutions of higher education. Studies report that 
authorized users played a critical role in protecting information resources. Several studies 
suggest best practices that institutions of higher education should follow for minimizing the risk 
of attacks on their information resources.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This study was designed to evaluate patterns of computer usage by faculty and staff 
members that could either protect or expose them or others to information security attacks. The 
study’s participants were from ETSU, a regional state university, and Milligan College, a private 
college in Northeast Tennessee. ETSU serves over 13, 000 undergraduate and graduate students 
(“ETSU enrollment surpasses”, 2007). Milligan College serves about 900 undergraduate and 
graduate students (Milligan College 2007—2008 Catalog, 2007).  
 
Research Design 
This study assessed behaviors of faculty and staff members that strengthen or weaken 
information security and investigated the relationship between these behaviors and information 
security awareness. In accordance with ethical research standards, approvals were obtained from 
the Institutional Review Boards at ETSU and Milligan College prior to conducting the study.  
A mixed-methods research approach was used in this study. Snyder (2006) identified 
three types of mixed-method design: exploratory design, explanatory design, and triangulation 
design. This study employed triangulation design, which provides a more comprehensive 
analysis of a problem and enhances the study’s validity. Qualitative and quantitative data are 
collected and analyzed simultaneously. The results of one method can then be used to support or 
contrast the results of the other (Snyder).  
The study was focused on computing behaviors that users engage in as they do work-
related tasks on computer systems. The study explored users’ awareness of and conformance to 
best practices for password management, document and electronic recourses disposal, data back-
up management, defense against malware, and defense against phishing e-mail. The study also 
explored users’ knowledge of FERPA, which specifically applies to institution of higher 
education. Additionally, the study explored user’ attitudes towards awareness and practice of 
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 information security. 
 
Qualitative Methods  
Data Collection Procedures 
The main data collection tool for the study’s qualitative portion was interviews. The 
interviews were conducted with IT personnel at ETSU and Milligan College in order to get their 
perceptions of how faculty and staff members use information technology. The interviews were 
voice recorded and transcribed. Member checks, a peer debriefer, and an external auditor were 
used to establish reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the extent to which a particular 
research technique consistently produces the same results, given repeated studies of the same 
concept (Babbie, 2000). Validity refers to the extent to which the findings of a study accurately 
reflect the reality of what is being explored (Babbie). 
Purposeful sampling was used to identify participants. Purposeful sampling is when 
participants who will be most informative about the subject are selected (McMillan & 
Schumacher, 2006).  Snowball sampling, which is a purposeful sampling strategy, was also used. 
Snowball sampling occurs when participants refer the researcher to other potential participants 
(McMillan & Schumacher). The participants were information technology professionals at both 
institutions. Once potential participants were identified, I e-mailed or met with each and invited 
them to participate in the study. I explained the study’s purpose and the participants’ rights, then 
obtained their informed consent. The guide in Appendix A was used to conduct the interviews. 
Additional, qualitative data were collected using question 40 on the survey instrument in 
Appendix B to evaluate faculty and staff members' attitudes toward the role they played in 
securing computer systems. The other 39 questions were used to collect data for the study’s 
quantitative portion. 
 
Research Question and Data Analysis 
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 The constant comparison method of data analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was used to 
 
 
 analyze the qualitative data collected from the interviews to answer research question 1. The 
qualitative data collected from question 40 on the survey to answer research question 2. These 
research questions were as follows: 
1. What are the computing behaviors of faculty and staff members that can either protect or 
expose them or others to information security attacks as observed by information 
technology professionals?   
2. What are the faculty and staff members’ attitudes toward the role they play in securing 
computer systems as reported by the faculty and staff members?  
This method involves comparing one set of data to another and organizing the data into 
categories until a theory emerges (Merriam, 1998). An external auditor and a peer debriefer were 
used to assess the consistency of the findings with the information gathered from the interviews 
and question 40 on the survey instrument. The auditor and the debriefer also ensured that the 
information gathered was used appropriately.  
 
Quantitative Methods  
Data Collection Procedures 
The online survey instrument given in Appendix B was used to collect self-reported data 
from the faculty and staff members at both institutions. Surveys are suitable for collecting self-
reported data about the participants’ beliefs or behaviors (Neuman, 1997). Surveys are usually 
used to collect data to test more than one hypothesis (Neuman). In addition, survey research is 
the appropriate method for this study because the study was designed to describe a population 
(Babbie, 2000). 
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This survey instrument, which was specific to this study, is a modified version of the 
Information Security Awareness (ISA) measurement instrument developed by Ryan (2006). The 
ISA measurement instrument consists of a user information security awareness scale, an 
information security practice scale, a personal innovativeness scale, and a computer self-efficacy 
scale. The survey’s reliability and validity have been established through a face validity check, a 
 
 
 pretest, a pilot test (N=286—business students—72% return rate) and a factor analysis of the 
results from the full administration of the survey (N=531 out of 4,938 sampled) by Ryan.  The 
alpha coefficients for each construct were above .80 (Ryan).   
The survey for this study was adopted and modified information security awareness and 
information awareness practice scales. The survey had four sections. The first section consists of 
demographic questions that inquired about the participant’s place of employment, gender, 
employment status, age, and the number of years of computer use. The next three sections were 
the user information security awareness scale, information security practice scale, and user 
attitude towards information security scale. The survey was self-administered online. The survey 
instrument is included in Appendix B. 
Before using the modified survey to conduct this research, I conducted an instrument 
review with Educational Leadership and Policy Analysis doctoral fellows to test the instrument’s 
validity and reliability. Alpha coefficients were computed to test the internal consistency of the 
awareness, practice, and attitude measures. The alpha coefficients for the awareness measure 
(.87) and the practice measure (.69) were acceptable. The alpha coefficient for the attitude 
measure was unacceptable (.18). Due to time constraints, a more reliable attitude measure was 
not constructed. Nevertheless, the questions for the attitude measure were included in the survey 
instrument. The data collected from these questions were used in the study’s descriptive portion 
as well as in the analysis of research question 4. However, results related to the attitude measure 
in question 4 should not be considered reliable.   
 
Population  
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The target population of this study was ETSU and Milligan College faculty and staff 
members including adjunct faculty and part-time employees. At the time of this survey, ETSU 
had an estimated 2,178 fulltime employees (ETSU Fact Book, 2007).  Milligan College had 
about 230 employees, including fulltime faculty, adjunct faculty, and staff (Milligan College 
2007—2008 catalog, 2007). Every employee at both institutions who had an institution-enabled 
 
 
 e-mail account was invited to participate in the study. At ETSU, permission to distribute the 
survey through e-mail was sought and received from the Vice President of Finance and 
Administration. The survey was then distributed through e-mail to faculty and staff members by 
the Associate Vice President of Information Technology.  At Milligan College, the survey 
information was sent to the Vice President of Academic Affairs, who in turn distributed it to 
faculty and staff members through e-mail.  
 
Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Data Analysis 
Descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyze the quantitative data. Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 15.0) was used to conduct the data analyses. The research 
questions, hypotheses, and data analysis methods are discussed below.   
3. What are the faculty and staff members’ computing behaviors that either protect or 
expose them or others to information security attacks as reported by the faculty and staff 
members?  
Descriptive statistics were used to evaluate research question 3. They described the faculty and 
staff members’ computing behaviors that either protect or expose them or members of their 
institutions to information security attacks. 
4. In what ways, if any, do attitudes towards information security, awareness of information 
security issues, and awareness of information security policies make a difference in how 
faculty and staff members use information technology? 
H04: There is no relationship between information security attitude score, 
information security awareness score, and information security practice score. 
Hypothesis H04 was tested using a paired-samples t-test to determine whether there is a 
relationship between attitudes towards information security, information security awareness, and 
information security practice.   
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5. What differences, if any, exist in information security awareness and practice among 
faculty and staff members with different demographic characteristics? 
 
 
 H051: There is no difference in information security awareness scores between 
faculty and staff members at ETSU and faculty and staff members at Milligan 
College.  
H052: There is no difference in information security practice scores between 
faculty and staff members at ETSU and faculty and staff members at Milligan 
College.   
Hypotheses H051 and H052 were evaluated using two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
to evaluate the differences in information awareness and practice means between faculty and 
staff members at ETSU and faculty and staff members at Milligan College. 
H053: There is no difference in information security awareness scores among 
those who are 20—29 years old, 30—39 years old, 40—49 years old, 50—59 
years old, and over 60 years old.  
H054: There is no difference in information security practice scores among those 
who are 20—29 years old, 30—39 years old, 40—49 years old, 50—59 years old, 
and over 60 years old.  
H055: There is no difference in information security awareness scores among 
those who had 15 years or less, 16—20 years, and over 20 years of computer use.  
H056: There is no difference in information security practice scores among those 
who had 15 years or less, 16—20 years, and over 20 years of computer use. 
Hypotheses H053, H054, H055, and H056 were tested using one-way ANOVAs to evaluate 
the differences in information awareness and practice means among age groups and years of 
computer use groups.   
H057: There is no difference in awareness and practice scores among those who 
spent a daily average of 2 hours or less, 3—4 hours, 5—6 hours, and 7 or more 
hours on the computer (not on the Internet). 
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 H058: There is no difference in awareness and practice scores among those who 
spent a daily average of less than 1 hour, 1—2 hours, and 3 or more hours on the 
Internet.  
Hypotheses H057 and H058 were tested using one-way MANOVAs to evaluate the 
differences in information awareness and practice means among daily average hours of computer 
use groups and daily average hours of Internet use groups.   
 
Summary 
Chapter 3 discussed the mixed methodology approach that was used to address the 
research questions. Selection criteria of participants, data collection procedures, and data analysis 
for each methodology were presented along with the hypotheses for the quantitative research 
questions were discussed.  
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 CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore faculty and staff members’ computing behaviors 
that either protect or expose them to information security attacks. The study used mixed-methods 
of data collection and analysis. Interviews were conducted with institutional technology (IT) 
professionals at ETSU and Milligan College and an online survey was completed by faculty and 
staff members at both institutions. The qualitative data and the quantitative data were presented 
and analyzed separately.  
 
Perceived Faculty and Staff Members’ Computing Behaviors   
IT professionals at ETSU and Milligan College were interviewed to assess their 
perceptions of faculty and staff members’ computing behaviors that either protect or expose 
them to information security attacks. Snowball sampling was used to identify participants. First, I 
contacted the assistant vice president of IT at ETSU and the IT manager at Milligan to get 
permission to interview people in their area. They referred me to potential participants. In total, I 
invited 10 IT professionals to participate through e-mail. Four from ETSU and two from 
Milligan College agreed to be interviewed. I used pseudonyms to protect the participants’ 
confidentiality. The years worked in IT at their respective institutions ranged from 5 years to 18 
years. Table 1 shows the participants’ pseudonyms and the institutions where they worked. 
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 Table 1 
Participants and Their Institutions  
Pseudonym Institution 
Allen Milligan College 
Ben ETSU 
Calvin Milligan College 
Fred ETSU 
Jim ETSU 
Ray ETSU 
 
 
The data from the interviews were analyzed to answer the following research question:  
What are the computing behaviors of faculty and staff members that either protect 
or expose them or others to information security attacks as observed by 
information technology professionals? 
 
Password Management  
IT professionals at Milligan and ETSU said that users’ password mismanagement was the 
major challenge they faced. Four major issues with passwords emerged. Interviewees stated that 
users tended to use simple passwords, share passwords, write passwords on sticky notes, and, in 
some cases, to end their sessions without logging off. Allen summed it up this way: 
The password management, they [faculty and staff members] are very poor at it. They 
share their passwords with students. They share their passwords with other users. They 
leave their machines logged on and unattended. Basically, they have no respect for 
security, as far as the data on the network.  
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 ETSU conducted a password analysis and found that users tended to chose simple 
passwords that could be easily guessed. According to Jim, ETSU has the evidence that users 
were choosing simple passwords: 
 
 
 We [ran] an analysis on our passwords here on campus and have found them to be 
lacking in effectiveness…. So we do have absolute proof that passwords are not very 
secure. They are not complex. They are easily guessed by dictionary lookup and so we 
are taking steps to prevent that right now.   
 This was supported by Ray who simply said, “They do not use complex passwords.” 
 Milligan College also faces the same challenge, as explained by Allen:  
No, they [Milligan faculty and staff] do not use strong passwords and we don’t have 
anything other than the number of characters, as far as restriction on the password. They 
can use anything they want. Lots of times they simply use part of their name, you know, 
and basically they chose this because they share with anybody and everybody. 
 Another problem was password sharing. It appears that it was common practice on both 
campuses for users to share passwords with their colleagues and student workers.  Calvin from 
Milligan said: 
I notice one of the problems we run into every now and then, because these things come 
up, we know that the faculty share their passwords with the students workers and other 
colleagues and things like that and we tell them not to do that but it always happens. I 
know that’s a major problem because they, you know, will have a student worker call up 
and say, “I can’t get logged in to so and so’s computer. They gave me their password but 
it’s not working.” We will call them up and say, “You are not supposed to be giving 
student workers your password. It’s not a good idea.” But we, I mean, we try to tell them 
not to do that but I don’t know if it’s convenient or they just forget about it or think this 
isn’t important. It’s okay. They go ahead and do that. So, I know it’s a major problem. 
 Ray from ETSU shared the same sentiment about ETSU users. He pointed out that in 
addition to sharing passwords, some users wrote them down and left them in plain sight where 
anyone can see them:  
Probably the number one violation of our Code of Ethics: they don’t keep their passwords 
secure… They will give it to their graduate student, their boss, their co-worker. If that 
password is out, anybody, you know, that gets on that system- it’s gonna look like it’s the 
person. They do not safeguard their passwords. They write them on post-it notes [and] 
stick them on the monitor, stick them under the keyboard, you know, tell somebody. And 
I don’t do that. That’s my password. Nobody else gets it. The people down the hall they 
can change it on me but they can’t look it up. That’s some of the—that’s one of the 
largest risk that we have. Example:  yesterday we went to change out a computer in this 
project and the lady—her account was logged in but she’s been on sick leave for several 
weeks. So somebody there has their password.  And we see that kind of stuff a lot.   
Ray also said there are exceptions—people who take the responsibility of guarding their 
passwords seriously. He said, “And opposite that, some of the behaviors we see are people that 
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 guard their password so well they wouldn’t tell it to me… there are other people that do 
safeguard their passwords well.”  This was consistent with what Ben said:  
In the password, the password management area, people tend to expose themselves by—
well, it used to be that people would, would be very open sharing their password with 
other people. I think that over the course of the last several years, with all the exposures 
that, Internet scams and of all that, that people have tended to listen when we’ve told 
them, “Don’t share your password.”  But unfortunately we have seen some instances on 
campus where a professor might share his password with a graduate student.   
Instead of sharing passwords with graduate assistants, Ben said ETSU provides 
departmental accounts for use by graduate students.  He explained: 
If it’s going in to enter some information into something we have a technique called a 
departmental account that you know just some, some name that maybe related, like 
graduate school might have a gstemp account, Grad School temporary account, and then 
there is a password associated with that the graduate student gets and then uses that 
account to do the administrative stuff. And then on a periodic basis those passwords are 
forced to change.  
The other problem that emerged was that a few users did not log off computer systems 
when they left the system. When asked whether faculty consistently logged off computers in the 
multimedia classrooms, Fred said:  
A lot of times when you wake up the computer, you will see somebody logged in. As far 
as security goes there, I mean, any activity you do will show up under that person, 
unfortunately…. That does happen. I see that, I don’t know, maybe say if I look at a 
computer, maybe 10 computers a week, just I don’t know how many but I would say at 
least 3 or 4 will have somebody logged in still. 
While discussing Milligan faculty and staff members’ password management, Allen said, 
“They leave their machines logged on and unattended.”  Figure 1 illustrates the password 
mismanagement problem. 
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Some participants gave reasons why users mismanaged their passwords. Ray attributed 
password mismanagement to attitudes not lack of knowledge. He said, “I think it’s the attitude of 
seriousness. Some people do not believe how serious a problem it can be for someone to come 
and get into their computer and look around.”  Allen said, “Basically they have no respect for 
security, as far as the data on the network.”  
Ben identified password complexity as a reason for writing down passwords:  
Another thing is that you know, people tend to write down these passwords, if they are 
particularly complicated. If the password is complicated and they may not have used a 
technique for creating it that they can remember it easily, they write it down on a little 
piece of paper and stick it on their computer, something like that. 
Participants also discussed actual or planned technical strategies for correcting the 
password mismanagement problem. Jim, from ETSU, said: 
We are in the middle of a process, right now as we speak, [of] activating Microsoft’s 
complex password algorithms as a part of Active Directory. Active Directory is 
becoming our single repository for passwords. That’s not—we are not there yet. We do 
now have single sign on and in moving in that direction it is apparent that Active 
Directory will become the repository of all passwords. We [have] a security committee 
that has advised IT and the IT Governance Council, the ITGC, and proposed and passed a 
policy for complex passwords. [The system] will retain previous passwords—I think it’s 
10 passwords that it remembers, the previous 10 that you cannot, you know, you cannot 
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 use any of those previous 10. You can only change your password once a day. So it’s 
gonna be a long, drawn out process and hopefully most people get the idea, ‘Okay, I 
understand I need to come up with a new password that’s secure that I can remember. 
ETSU did indeed implement this complex password policy on February 27, 2008, not 
long after this interview with Jim (“Campus-wide Password Policy,” 2008).   
Milligan College also forces users to change passwords periodically, although it does not 
have a complex password policy. Calvin stated: 
We don’t force strong passwords although we have a minimum. I think a minimum of 
like 7 characters. We don’t let them go below seven. I think—I will double check that but 
I think it’s five or seven characters. We try to lengthen it a little bit so that they don’t 
have a two-letter password or something that’s really easy. But we do not force 
encryption as far as requiring them to do upper and lowercase letters and symbols and 
things like that. So we didn’t wanna make it too difficult for them…. For password 
management I can tell you we implement here a forced change of password every—once 
a year. Some people do it more often. We force it once a year and we retain I think either 
5 or 7, I think 7 old passwords. They can’t reuse them. 
This was supported by Allen who said, “Yeah, we, we force it twice a year. It’s random. 
We don’t hit the switch and say change passwords. I mean the computer just generally, just 
randomly selects and it’s changed twice a year.”  
When asked whether the password mismanagement problem, specifically password 
sharing, would ever end, Allen said: 
I think there will always be passwords and I think there will always be management 
problems with passwords. When I see it becoming—getting corrected is when somebody 
falls victim to sharing their password. And something happens that—happens to them 
that they are accountable for because it was done on their login. They can’t say it wasn’t 
and they have no defense it wasn’t them. Then that’s when they learn—that’s when they 
learn how important it is.  
 
Portable Storage Devices and Laptop Security 
Participants commented on the challenge of securing laptops and portable storage 
devices. When asked whether users were aware of the need to secure USB flash drives, Ray, 
from ETSU, said, “They are not. They are not.” Allen from Milligan said, “Data storage devices, 
they leave them lying around everywhere. Anybody can grab it you know. As far as, you know, 
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 JumpDrives, flash disks, anything like that, you can find them lying around everywhere.”   
Ray gave a specific example of an incident that occurred at ETSU that demonstrates the 
risks of portable devices in the hands of users who are not prepared to secure the data on those 
devices:  
And, also Judith, we have had people have laptops stolen. And you probably read of 
stories where, I think it was last year, a Veterans Affairs employee had one stolen that 
had lots of personal information. Laptops are not for that and they, they store confidential 
information on them and it’s very much easier for someone to gain access to that data on 
the laptop. We had a nurse that had before and after pictures of surgical patients on her 
laptop. And she took it down to Best Buy. It’s an ETSU piece of property. She took it to a 
Best Buy to have iTunes put on it so she can listen to her music.  Essentially she turned it 
over with photographs of these individuals. It could have been a hand surgery, you know, 
it could have been breast enhancement but that young man at the counter had all of it. 
You can’t do that. It’s very hard to convince people that this is a serious issue.  
As far as portable storage devices and confidential documents being left in multimedia 
classrooms at ETSU, Fred said, “People will leave stuff. Yeah, they do that sometimes. I don’t 
see that a whole lot fortunately.  JumpDrives, people are pretty good [at not leaving them 
behind].” 
Participants admitted that the security of portable devices has not been fully resolved yet. 
Portable devices have recently become mainstream and the IT world is still exploring ways to 
secure them. One solution is data encryption, but it is not currently practical for many users. The 
most practical solution so far has been to raise user awareness and to discourage users from 
storing confidential information on portable devices. Ben said: 
Yeah, the JumpDrive, the prevalence of JumpDrives is a really sticky issue and it’s not 
really something that, I think, we have fully come to grips with. The stories about 
information being lost through various government agencies losing laptops and losing 
JumpDrives that have social security numbers, we try to play that up as much as we can 
on campus, making sure people know about what happened, know why it happened, 
know why they should not do the same thing that that person who was at another 
institution did. It is a problem and there really isn’t much of a satisfactory solution to it 
unless you actually go so far as to encrypt the, the data that’s on the laptop and on the 
JumpDrive. And so many people don’t do that because right now a lot of the computers 
[they are] going back to, say at home, may not be powerful enough to decrypt the data in 
a timely way so that they—they have performance issues in that. But just making sure 
people know about what other people have done.  
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 While commenting on managing portable data storage devices, Jim pointed out that 
ETSU is currently developing specific policies regarding the protection of portable storage 
devices and laptops:  
As far as IT policies, there are none, currently, for disposal of JumpDrives.  You see them 
[JumpDrives], they are everywhere. We have just alluded to a security committee, we 
have instituted a security committee and that is one thing that the new chair has been 
charged with, is looking at, at those kinds of policies. A sister university, Tennessee 
Tech, was recently exposed when a JumpDrive was lost and it had confidential 
information about students on it—no one wants that to be repeated here, so we will be 
pursuing appropriate polices there. We do, in our Acceptable Use Policy, talk about 
confidential data in broad terms but we don’t address, you know, a specific type of a 
device.   
Jim also supported data encryption as a solution. He noted that ETSU might implement 
that in the future, for laptops as well as desktops:  
One nice thing that we are looking forward to Vista for, it’s a list of about one, is the 
ability to encrypt the entire contents a hard drive or a laptop. And we again have been 
talking about as Vista is implemented here that, that will be a requirement for any laptop 
running Vista and maybe even desktops because those can be stolen, those can be 
compromised but especially laptops. 
Ray shared some practical advice regarding storing confidential information on USB 
flash drives:  
It is a very convenient method, but just like a laptop, confidential data should not go on 
those drives. They are too portable. They are too easy to lose. They are too easy to have 
them stolen. That type of data should be stored up on the network with the only way it 
can be gotten into is by logging into that user’s account and if they don’t give out the 
password, it will be secure. 
Milligan encourages users to use the network storage space to store confidential 
information; however, Allen pointed out that security of the data on the network can be 
compromised by password sharing. He stated, “We do offer network storage space on our servers 
and if they’ve shared their passwords then whoever has their password has access to that.” 
Ray also expressed concern about confidential documents being left in plain sight where 
they can be seen by anybody who walks in. He stated: 
But I have been in offices, personally, where confidential information was sitting right 
above of the keyboard while the person was gone, you know, gone home for the day or 
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 whatever. They leave that stuff out. It’s not just electronic confidentiality that’s breached. 
They do leave their hardcopies of, you know, social security numbers, just about anything 
you can think about, you can find on somebody’s desk any time of the day.  
 
Disposal of Confidential Information  
I could not identify any campus-wide document disposal policies at either campus. 
However, several offices have shredders and some offices at ETSU use a document shredding 
company to dispose of confidential documents.  Ray said: 
It’s becoming better. A lot of areas we have a contract with the document shredding 
company. And a lot of buildings or offices have the padlock bin.  They put the paper 
documents in and they shred it at the truck and nobody else has access to it.  
Calvin had this to say about documents disposal policies at Milligan: 
I know we don’t have any policy that we tell them about, at least as far as, destroying 
documents. I know offices individually, Registrar’s Office, our office and all that have 
shredders so that if we have confidential documents we shred them but as far as the 
individual faculty and staff in other departments—we don’t at least have an overall 
policy. I don’t know if one of the other offices have it or not. I haven’t heard about it.  
When asked whether users use those shredders, Calvin said, “I know, I know other 
offices do but, you know, I doubt the average faculty member [is] going have a shredder, so they 
may not be. They may be just dumping their documents in the trash.”  
 
Data Back-Up Management 
The ETSU participants said that users usually do not back up their data. They had 
experienced cases where users lost their data as a result of a corrupted hard drive or accidental 
data deletion. Jim said, “It happens rather frequently, unfortunately. Most commonly is a hard 
drive that’s going bad and they do not have a backup—a thumb drive copy or a USB drive copy 
of it in some way. Another is an accidental deletion.”  He added:  
We have invested in tools that will attempt to recover those files—deleted files or recover 
sectors of a disk that’s going bad and those can take an inordinate amount of time so we 
do pay for that through, not only for the software, but we pay for it with time.  
Ray said:  
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 Every day we get a call from somebody, “My hard drive died. Can you get my stuff 
back?” Sometimes we can, sometimes we can’t. It just depends on the physical failure of 
the component.  They do not do regular backups…. They don’t do it. They don’t take the 
time or they don’t believe it’s possible that they can be wiped out.  
Then he added: 
It’s a very hard lesson to learn but sometimes when it happens, they will realize the 
benefit of backups and they will start doing it…. You know, they are very diligent about 
it after they have had a catastrophe once.  
Participants discussed how they dealt with those situations. They stated that each user and 
every department has allocated storage space on campus servers. The servers are backed-up 
frequently such that if the servers ever fail, the data can be restored. They encourage users to use 
that space to store their documents. Ben said: 
We have procedures so that all data on the systems that we managed are backed up once 
a week, what we call our full backup, and then after that we do what are known as 
differential backups where files that have changed since the full backup are backed-up 
every other day. So users on their desktops are generally covered if they have their data 
on the Q: drive…since that is on the common storage, that is on the server, that data is 
backed up on a regularly scheduled basis and information can be restored, if something is 
lost. But if the information is just on a local desktop, on a PC, then it is not stored by OIT 
on a regular basis, so the user, if they are interested and need to store that, then we tell 
them that they do their own backups.  
Ray supported this and also added that users can use external hard-drives or CD to back-
up their data.  
Those external hard drives, that silver box sitting down there, that’s perfect [for] backups 
but they don’t want to deal with it. Every new computer for the last 4 years has had at 
least a CD burner in it. They can burn a CD. Now if they are saving those data up on the 
network, on the server, we’ve got backups. We do it every night.   
Jim also confirmed the use of server side storage. He said, “There is no required backup 
of desktop computers. We have encouraged departments to look at server side storage. We 
provide each department with a share, a drive share on one of the servers here.”  But he also 
described problems related to the misuse of server storage space:  
That becomes a double edged sword because then you will have a department that says, 
“Well, I’m going to save everything on the server” and they start putting personal 
pictures, music files, their iTunes library, things that aren’t work related. So then that 
becomes a policing policy with disk quotas, with—and when it’s a departmental share 
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 one person can fill all that up and then the department suffers because they can’t store 
anything else that maybe important, may be work related because this individual has put 
their movies from their vacation up on the server. Policing that becomes a real problem, 
the overhead.  
Allen, from Milligan College, agreed that users do not back up their data often on their 
own. Allen said, “That’s, that’s very common, you know. If any data backup is done, we do it for 
them. They have no concept of data backup. No they don’t.” This was supported by Calvin who 
said that data loss was infrequent because Milligan encourages users to store data on its servers:  
Fairly rarely. Like I said we try to encourage them to store their, at least, important 
documents up on the network storage as well so we can back that up and recover it for 
them. We have had some cases where if a hard drive had gone completely south and they 
have had everything stored there on the local drive that we won’t be able to recover it for 
them. That’s pretty rare, though. Usually we would run into a case, if someone’s 
computer crashes and their hard drive is going bad we can usually recover the rest of their 
data off that drive. So that has been rare. It caused us some headaches obviously, if they 
haven’t backed up their data themselves, extra work here. I can’t really recall any case, 
well, not frequent cases were they have lost their data. Now we’ve had cases where, very 
rarely, maybe one or two since I’ve been here, where people have even stored something 
on the network drive and then immediately deleted it before we had a backup of it so 
therefore, we couldn’t recover it for them because we didn’t have a backup of it.  
 
Defense Against Malware and Spyware 
A few years ago, ETSU and Milligan struggled with malware risk management. Ray 
from ETSU said, “At one point 4 or 3 years ago we will get spyware tickets all the time.”  Jim 
supported this by stating:  
So in the past we have had people who have had hundreds of malware applications on a 
single computer at one time because one will download, another will download 10, others 
will download 50 others, and all of a sudden the computer becomes unusable. 
Allen from Milligan said, “Two years ago, 3 years ago, this department probably spent 
90% of the time cleaning spyware off of machines. Because we support the student body as well 
as faculty and staff, we spent 90% of the time doing that.” 
Ben discussed a specific incident where a user’s actions caused an infection on the ETSU 
campus:  
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 Since I’ve been here we have had one incident where we were bitten by this. It was a user 
who had gone, I guess it was overseas, maybe Europe and when they came back, they 
brought their laptop over to the campus network and plugged it in and they had a 
prototype, prototype malware. It wasn’t in production, shall we say, it had not been 
launched into the wild. Somehow they had picked up this prototype and when they 
brought it on to campus, it got on to our network and it took us 4 days to get things under 
control. 
Participants said that user awareness of malware and how it infects computers has 
increased. Allen from Milligan said, “I think they are aware of it...” Calvin agreed and 
commented on the efforts they made to educate the users:  
I think they are….And I think we have done a fairly good job of, whatever meetings we 
have had and e-mails going out, warning people about what to expect and what type of 
things to look out for that could be adware and spyware. 
However, Calvin said other strategies for managing malware made it difficult to judge the 
extent to which awareness translated into practice of safe computing behaviors:   
So, I think they are a lot more aware of that especially considering the fact that that 
would also, since they are getting blocked if they do click on something and they 
suddenly see it was blocked from our spyware firewall I think they will get the idea very 
quickly, “I shouldn’t be going to sites like that, anything like that.” So I think they are 
aware of it. A lot of it we do it for them, is the thing, and we try to keep any spyware 
software on the systems themselves including using the spyware firewall. So I can’t say 
how much is knowledge we’ve imparted to them or they’ve gotten just in all been 
protected from that by the firewall.  
ETSU’s IT department, like Milligan’s IT department, has made efforts to educate users 
about malware so that that user awareness of malware could increase. Ray said:  
Our users are becoming much more cautious and educated. We see that through our help 
desk records. We see trends over the years. At one point 4 or 3 years ago, we would get 
spyware tickets all the time and what we do is we go to the user and we explain what 
happened to them and we say well, you shouldn’t go to this website, you shouldn’t be 
doing this during work hours, it’s not work related, that’s how your machine got messed 
up. Some malware is so bad that we cannot fix the machine. We have to wipe it and 
rebuild. I mean, it’s very insidious. But I do believe that our users, thanks to the people 
on the frontlines that go out and visit face-to-face and fix the problem, they will talk to 
them and explained to them how it happened and it changes their behavior. It does. 
Ben also said users were more aware of malware, but he cautioned that the problem was 
still unresolved. Our conversation was as follows: 
Ben:  
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 Yeah, I think so. Although we have had some battles we have had to fight and I don’t 
think we’ve totally won these battles along the way, but . . .  
Judith:  
What battles? 
Ben:  
There were some, there were some instructors that like to go out on the Internet and like 
to look for tools that they can use in instruction and you know, can’t really fault them for 
that but unfortunately sometimes when they do that they bring things back in these, in 
these programs. So then they would have, you know have possible hooks in the program 
that could—so that the program can be used to download viruses or whatever, so we’ve 
tried to get, we’ve tried to raise awareness, I guess. Actually, we’ve tried to stop them. 
But we at least try to raise awareness that when they go download this free instructional 
package that looks wonderful there may be a price to pay down the road for all of us.   
Ben’s comment reflected one of the reasons why ETSU and Milligan College had 
struggled with malware during those years. Faculty and staff members at ETSU and Milligan 
College have administrative privileges on their office computers; this means that they can 
download and install any software. Jim explained the problem this way:  
But users are still administrators of their desktop and laptop computers. And right now 
any user on campus, any faculty or staff member can go out and format the C: drive and 
lose all their data or they can download a piece of malware and install it and we are not 
able to prevent that. 
Ray elaborated: 
There are certain, there are some applications out there that will install whether you are 
an administrator or not but a lot of them if you don’t have administrative rights, you are 
not gonna mess up the machine. Look at student labs. They are locked down. No student 
is an administrator when they sit down on the lab machines. It’s extremely rare that the 
lab machine will be messed up with malware or spyware. 
Although user awareness has increased, interviewees attributed most of their success in 
controlling malware to technical defenses that both ETSU and Milligan had implemented, rather 
than to changes in user behavior.  Even though Allen acknowledged that users were more aware, 
he thought they depended more on IT to protect them. Allen attributed Milligan’s success to 
implementing the Barracuda Firewall: “I think they are aware of [malware] but they don’t 
care….IT can take care of it. IT can fix up that—what we mess up, you know. Barracuda has 
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 really been a lifesaver.” This was supported by Calvin, who said: 
And a large help though I think is the fact that we actually have an anti-spyware firewall 
that sits between us and the Internet and that’s made a tremendous difference because 
even if someone tries to download spyware it won’t let them. And if they, if they come in 
with a machine that’s infected with it, the firewall will detect that and usually warn them 
they need to clean that up and offer them a little thing to clean it up with. 
Allen also described, in percentage terms, how Barracuda helped them. He said:  
Two years ago, 3 years ago, this department probably spent 90% of the time cleaning 
spyware off of machines. Because we support the student body as well as faculty and 
staff,  we spent 90% of our time doing that.  Since we put Barracuda in, we are probably 
spending less than 1%. 
ETSU also did not depend entirely on the users.  Jim said: 
We don’t want to detect it that way when the user says the computer is acting funny. It’s 
already, it’s already done something to that computer. And it can be very difficult to 
clean, so we do have more proactive steps in place.  
For that reason, ETSU implemented Symantec products.  Jim explained: 
What we have done in the interim is invested in additional [anti-]malware software. It is 
part of our anti-virus agreement with Symantec. The enterprise anti-virus also includes 
malware detection and cleaning. It does very good at detection. It does very good at 
cleaning. Sometimes we still have to do some manual intervention to clean a computer of 
malware but most times we are notified. We have a central server that all desktops talk 
back to and when they detect a virus or malware or anything, that central server is 
notified and an alert is sent out at that point that ‘oh we’ve got a virus outbreak and it’s 
been cleaned or we’ve got a malware situation over here and it’s being cleaned or maybe 
it’s not been cleaned.’ So by instituting that we have actually prevented a lot of malware 
from being installed. We have also detected where it can be installed. 
Ben supported this and also discussed another product they are considering for 
implementation:  
There are—one of the technologies that we are contemplating is what’s known as NAC, 
Network Access Control and with NAC when a machine comes on to the network it 
automatically goes to a particular quarantine area where the machine is scanned to make 
sure that it has antivirus software, that it does not have an active virus of any kind on it. If 
it does not meet certain criteria then until it’s uh it comes to the standards that it will not 
be allowed to get on to the general campus network. This is something we are working 
towards but we don’t currently have because it’s a very expensive solution. But yes, that, 
that generally speaking I can’t think of any other instances where we have had uh a wide 
spread problem really although occasionally people do get viruses and we haven’t had an 
outbreak because the Symantec software that we are using is very good. 
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 Defense Against Phishing E-mail 
Participants agreed that phishing e-mails are a major problem. The main problem is that 
phishing e-mails look legitimate. Jim described the problem this way: 
I sent a mass e-mail out ah this week or last week because a phishing attempt got on to 
campus that was for a local bank. Those are really scary to me. It’s one thing when it’s 
Washington Mutual Bank. We don’t have that—any branches of that bank around here.  
And we hope people have some common sense to say, “Well, I’m not gonna do that. I 
don’t bank with them,” and delete it. But when you see one come in that’s from the 
Tennessee Credit Union, which we have had happen, or a local bank like Carter County 
Bank…” 
Ray gave a specific example:  
Last year we had three people who had their savings accounts at the Credit Union up here 
wiped out because they looked at a mail that looked legitimate, clicked on the link, filled 
out all the information and somebody ah they went and withdrew the money from their 
savings account.  
ETSU’s and Milligan’s IT departments use spam filtering products and education to 
combat phishing. Communication with users is helpful in raising awareness. Jim said:  
We do use Brightmail, which is a software product that sits on a server and all e-mail 
coming in to campus is examined by Brightmail for spam and phishing is really a type of 
spam. It’s an unsolicited bulk e-mail…. And we are rejecting anywhere from 60 to 80 % 
of the mail that is attempting to campus every day. Spam is that much. Most of the 
phishing attempts are being caught there. Sometimes they do get through and like I said, 
as recently as last week, I think it was last week, I put an alert out and I sent a mass e-
mail out to faculty and staff saying this one got through. This is a hoax don’t click on it 
don’t do anything. Just delete it. And so we do—we are as proactive as technically we 
can be. But then we do try to be in a reactive mode so when someone tells the help desk, 
“Hey, I got this. Is this legitimate” or “I got this, this is awfully suspicious” or “I got this 
and this worries me” we do try to take action. And then we also—the other action we 
took, we not only send a mass e-mail and an alert, but we also went to the e-mail server. 
We said anything else coming from this address don’t accept it, even if Brightmail has 
not been updated yet to, to delete this, to not deliver it, you don’t pass it through to their 
inbox. So we do have controls at the entrance to campus for all e-mail and it’s examined 
for spam, it’s examined for viruses, it’s examined for malware. 
Ben supported this:  
Phishing really comes more under the spam fighting and uh recently we made some 
adjustments to our spam fighting so that now we are catching like 86% of the spam that 
comes into the university or—rather 86% of the e-mails that come into the university are 
being caught as spam and phishing is a small portion of that. We don’t see a lot of 
 54  
 
 
 phishing attempts that are marked as such by the software. But this is really more of an 
educational function here. If we see something that looks like it’s a phishing attempt, then 
we try to get a notice out. If it’s serious enough we put it—well, we get it out on a 
message to the, on the help desk phone line. Plus if it’s serious enough we actually put it 
out on the ETSU alerts page on the website. 
Ray said that users are also becoming more aware and proactive in verifying the 
legitimacy of these e-mails:  
They are becoming smarter and like a lot of times they will send me, they will forward it 
to me directly and say, “Is this a scam?” And I will respond, “Yes, point at the link and 
you will see it has nothing to do with that company.” So they are, they are starting to 
think about it now.  
Milligan implemented similar defenses. Calvin said: 
We have a spam firewall, not spam firewall, a spam filtering software that we run on our 
Exchange server and does a fairly good job of catching a good portion of the phishing. 
We block 80—around 80% of all incoming mail is blocked immediately as spam and that 
catches a lot of the phishing e-mails. Not all of them. We still get a leak—I get, you 
know, I don’t know, maybe four or five a day still. We get a leak still. We have in various 
times especially when we have had a large influx of a certain type of e-mail come in we 
will send—if we have had a whole bunch come out, we send a blanket e-mail out saying 
this is a recent phishing scam that’s come out. Please keep an eye out for it and beware 
not to do this. And we, every now and then, just remind faculty and staff, “Here is what 
to look for in a phishing e-mail.” Even if it’s not a specific example, you know.  If it’s 
asking you for personal information, if it’s a bank you don’t do banking with and things 
like that but not to click on it, or to call us, if they have any questions about it. And some 
of our faculty are also very good about it. If they get something that’s warning about a 
virus or phishing or all that, they will send it to us and say, “Is this legitimate or not”, 
which is good.  
 
FERPA Awareness 
The participants declined to make judgments about FERPA, on the grounds that their 
respective Registrar’s Offices were responsible for assuring FERPA compliance. Allen said: 
As far as FERPA, that is really handled through our registrar’s office. They do all the 
education on that and—with the faculty and staff and keep us up to data uh and keep us 
notified of consent and all that so—okay. 
Jim said, “The FERPA compliance office is really the Registrar’s Office, it’s not IT.” 
However, he also noted that users who have access to the student information systems at ETSU 
are presented with a FERPA statement every time they log in to the systems. Whether they read 
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 it, Jim said, cannot be determined: 
We are in the process of migrating to a new student system. Today’s system, every time a 
user signs on they are presented with a FERPA statement. They should be aware of it. 
Now many people get into the habit of typing SIS (for Student Information System), SIS 
enter, enter and it flashes the screen up and maybe it goes away. But it is displayed every 
time they log in with the current system. The new system, we have not put that in place 
yet but we are not in true production on that yet…. 
Ray said he thought that users were aware of FERPA but did not understand the 
implications of violating FERPA guidelines:  
We have had examples where a parent had accessed a student’s grades by virtue of her 
job position. You know, she was supposed to help other students. She went and looked up 
her kid’s grades…. She was an employee, her child was a student.  She had no reason to 
look at her child’s grades but by having access to the records, she did and she said 
something to the child and the child became extremely unhappy with ETSU because 
those were suppose to be private. That person, even though it was a parent, had no reason 
to be looking at her grades. So that was a large violation against FERPA guidelines. I 
don’t know the outcome of that situation but those are the type of things that can happen.  
They are aware of it. I just don’t think that the seriousness of it has—not sunk in, I don’t 
believe.   
 
Academic Freedom and Administrative Privileges  
ETSU and Milligan College grant faculty and staff members administrative privileges for 
their office computers. ETSU’s IT department would prefer to grant users administrative 
privileges on an as-needed basis but have not been permitted to implementing this policy because 
the faculty and staff have argued that removing these privileges impedes academic freedom. Jim 
shared his experience: 
We talked about this one when you came to visit earlier and the, the ability or the 
accessibility of free software on the Internet has been something we have really struggled 
with here. We have at times tried to restrict the privileges that individual users have on 
their desktop and we have not been successful. IT has presented a very strong case that 
there are vulnerabilities and the fact that all employees have administrative rights to the 
computer, their primary computer is a serious concern to us. The governance committee 
that we have, the structure that we have here never thought that the benefit outweigh the 
downside. So that has never been instituted…. But users are still administrators of their 
desktop and laptop computers. And right now any user on campus, any faculty or staff 
member can go out and format the C: drive and lose all their data or they can download a 
piece of malware and install it and we are, we are not able to prevent that. Oh, they can 
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 download good things too. I mean, they can go get real educational tools or tools for 
research and that’s the, that’s the side that always gets heard louder than us about the 
security risks – is the, “Oh, I need that for my class.” And their argument has always 
been, “Yes, computer science, they need that. Yes, technology may need that.” But the 
secretary in the psychology department probably doesn’t. The clerk in Bursar’s office 
probably doesn’t. And we have done some pilots, and this was fascinating to me, it didn’t 
carry enough weight for anybody else, but we went into a particular department in the 
administration building and we made a deal with them. We said let us keep your people 
from being administrators. We promised we will address any needs that they have. 
Because they were coming, they had several employees that, that loved to go and surf the 
internet and download things and you know. It’s a screen saver or it’s a picture viewer, 
you know, something free is the hook. And they’d go in several days a month and the 
computer will be unusable because spyware, malware will be installed on it and they 
couldn’t do their business. So we made a deal with them and said, you want to come in 
everyday and do your business, right?  Let us do this. Let us remove administrative 
privilege and we will promise to do whatever it takes to keep your, your software loaded 
and up-to-date. We’ll do that for you but we will also guarantee that your computer is 
going to work at 8:00 every morning. And they agreed and it did and it worked and they 
don’t miss it. We tried to use that as proving grounds and hold that up to everybody else. 
We just have not been real successful with that. 
Ray shared the same sentiments: 
There are certain, there are some applications out there that will install whether you are 
an administrator or not but a lot of them if you don’t have administrative rights, you are 
not gonna mess up the machine. Look at student labs. They are locked down. No student 
is an administrator when they sit down on the lab machines. It’s extremely rare that the 
lab machine will be messed up with malware or spyware. But we attempted to not give 
everybody administrative rights some years ago and we were shut down with a loaded 
canon. There is no university policy that says who gets it, who doesn’t. By default they 
told us everybody who has a computer at their desk can be an administrator. We do not 
allow students to be administrators on faculty and staff machines but when you give the 
faculty or staff administrative rights, they can sit down and make the student an 
administrator. 
Milligan College IT professionals differed from ETSU IT professionals regarding 
administrative privileges. Allen said: 
I’m fine with it [administrative privileges]. As far as our lab environment, we have those 
secured, you know, depending on your, your login, what you have access to. But as far as 
the local machine, we give them, we grant them full access to the local machine.  
He also said: 
Well, the thing about it is there are so many things that an individual may use that you 
can’t say no you can’t have it or yes you can. And if you got them secured you are 
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 loosening that security all the time to let them do something or you are running over there 
to login as an administrator to do that for them. 
Calvin agreed: 
I usually prefer that people not have admin privileges on their local system but it hasn’t 
become an issue as far as systems getting, you know, run out with spyware or viruses, 
and things like that. If that became a large issue we might have to revisit that but thus far 
it hasn’t been a big issue, so it is the convenience that it offers them so that we don’t have 
to go and install things for them and all that, and a convenience for us. The savings in 
time is worth a lot at the moment at least.  
A statement by Ray summed up participants’ perceptions of faculty and staff members 
computing behaviors that affect their exposure to information security attacks: 
But I would say the two primary issues that ETSU deal with as far as the desktop, 
password management and giving everybody administrative rights. You know, that’s the 
biggest problem for my group in particular, you know. But, you know, on the bright side 
the users are becoming more aware. They are becoming more educated about safe 
computing practices. 
 
Ethics of Computing  
Participants in this study repeatedly raised concerns about ethical and legal aspects of 
computer use, especially with respect to pornography, using university computing resources to 
run a personal business, and peer-to-peer file sharing. My conversation with Ray was as follows: 
Ray:  
Probably the only other thing that we at ETSU have issues with as far as security, there 
are legal aspects to computing and I don’t know if human resources shares that with them 
in orientation or not but they are certain things you can’t do. You can’t look at child 
pornography. That’s illegal. You can’t.  And then other things, Judith, I believe that are 
important that are not really shared with the employees are the ethics of computing. You 
shouldn’t sit in here and run a home business from your office computer and they do.  
Judith:  
It actually happens? 
Ray:  
Yeah. Pyramid schemes—you’ve heard of pyramid schemes where people wrap in one 
person, who wraps in another. Nothing ever exchanges hands but you pay a fee to be a 
representative of this company. It’s crazy. We had somebody who ran her pyramid 
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 scheme from her ETSU computer. And sometimes we are just not given the power to do 
anything about it except to tell them no, you can’t do that.  
Jim also said: 
We have been involved in cases, legal cases, where employees have sent improper e-
mails or employees have been doing inappropriate things at work with the network. We 
have invested in computer forensics software that will undelete deleted files, will look 
through slack space on, on clusters of sectors of the disk and with the size of the hard 
drive today getting so big and the ah cluster size getting to be such a large number 
sectors, it’s very common to be able to find whole files that nothing shows it’s there but 
this forensic software will go get it. And we’ve been asked to look for memos and 
spreadsheets and child pornography and regular pornography and doing commerce on 
campus, which is not allowed. I couldn’t set up a private business, you know, and be 
selling things from my desktop computer here and we’ve had people doing things like 
that.  
Participants from Milligan College and ETSU shared common concerns about peer-to-
peer sharing. Jim commented on peer-to-peer file sharing:  
Another thing is peer-to-peer trafficking. Music, movies, software—everybody likes 
music, everybody would like their music to be free. Everybody enjoys watching movies. 
They would like for them to be free. And there are people who trade in those things on 
the Internet and we are held accountable for that. The University is held accountable for 
what employees and students do. 
Allen shared the same concern: 
I have a real concern about the sharing of copyrighted material through networks and we 
take action against here at, you know, here we discourage every faculty. If we find it we 
stop it. You know we do have thing in—as a matter of fact Barracuda is our content filter. 
So we have content filter on the network. We also block peer-to-peer sharing of music 
and things like that. 
ETSU and Milligan have established procedures for addressing ethical or legal problems 
that arise from inappropriate computer use. Jim stated that the Human Resources department 
usually gets involved. Jim said: 
So when we, several years ago, when we started seeing an increase in that kind of 
activity, we found ourselves as being kind of the judge, jury, and executioner and we 
didn’t want to be that. It was—it was not wrong to OIT for someone to, while they are 
being paid, trafficking pornography. It’s really a human resource issue, so we got that 
restructured. That’s why you will see our acceptable use policy is now a human resources 
policy because it is your employment with the university that you are abusing as much as 
you are abusing our resources too and you are misrepresenting the university in bad light. 
So now when, when an incident is detected, if someone reports it to us, we just send it to 
 59  
 
 
 HR then HR comes to us and says yeah, we have looked at this and I think we have got 
an issue here. 
Users should understand that their computers and the data on the computer belong to the 
institution. Jim said: 
And it is the University’s data, even if it’s a personal e-mail from a family member. That 
data belongs to the University. That’s spelled out in the policy and that’s what everyone 
agrees to. And I was telling you about that that they are apprised of it during orientation. 
When they sign on that’s what they are agreeing to. Those have been the stickiest issues.   
Allen expressed an opinion that users have responsibility to use information systems 
ethically:  
I think we’ve got to educate our students, our faculty and staff, you know, that it is 
wrong, ethically, you know wrong, morally wrong, you know, and try to keep that in 
front of them. I think they have to be held accountable for what they do. Just because it’s 
there doesn’t mean it’s right. Yeah, that’s, that’s an individual’s decision.   
Jim noted that the university has limited authority as far as controlling what users can 
access on the Internet. The university, as an educational entity, cannot restrict user access as 
much as those in the private sector can.  Jim explained: 
So we have put in—and we are a university and we are not about blocking or censoring 
information. We are not and we are very different from a corporate entity because of that. 
If we were Tennessee Eastman, you know, if it wasn’t a chemical website, you know, we 
can say, that’s not appropriate. We don’t want you to be looking at the New York Times. 
We don’t want you looking at it because it’s not part of your job, your reason for being 
here. We are a university. We have all kinds of people studying all kinds of things. We 
have had people doing research projects in child pornography—in political science and 
criminal justice. And if those are approved, kind of like your project was approved, we 
wouldn’t take any action. I mean, if they are helping solve these issues, why would we 
want to stand in the way of that—looking for abused and missing children. We wouldn’t 
want to [impede] that. We have a College of Medicine. If someone wants to look at 
anatomy—some people may consider that pornography, but there are anatomy classes 
here. There are art classes where nude models are in the room with the students here. 
How do you block a picture of a naked human body and not infringe on their rights to be 
a student of that. So I do understand academic freedom and I do respect it. I just think 
there are limits to that excuse.  
Milligan College, a private college, can restrict access to some kinds of information that 
ETSU does not control.  Allen said: 
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 Here we have a lot of filtering on our network. Our—we filter content, we filter 
pornography, we can filter gambling, we filter—we block a lot of stuff, you know, and 
we get a lot of complains about things being blocked, but it happens. 
Allen added: 
See we are private, we are a Christian oriented school and when you come here, you 
know, you are expected to have these morals and you know, we try to protect those 
morals and instill those morals but I don’t really know if we do real well by blocking it. 
You know, the temptation is not there, you know, in a lot of ways, so I don’t know how 
well that’s teaching anything.  
 
User Awareness Programs 
The IT departments at ETSU and Milligan College use several methods to communicate 
urgent and nonurgent information security messages to faculty and staff members. ETSU uses 
mass e-mailings, an alerts webpage, and a text messaging system to communicate urgent 
messages to the ETSU community. Jim said: 
We use several different notification methods. Most commonly we use ah mass e-mail. 
We also use the alert page on our website. We have recently instituted a text messaging 
system that could be used for things like that.  Those are for kind of immediate outbreaks.  
Ray added:  
We here at ETSU, not personally but as a department, we use e-mail a lot, mass e-mail. If 
there is a new type of phishing e-mail coming out that looks legitimate we determine if it 
warrants an e-mail to go out to the campus community.  
Ben said they also used the help desk: 
We usually, what we, what we tend to do is to funnel this sort of information to our OIT 
help desk, both the faculty and staff help desk, and the student help desk, if there are any 
issues that we identify on the serve side. 
According to Allen, Milligan College relies mostly on e-mail, “Usually the—our, our 
main means of communication is by e-mail, campus-wide. We periodically send out e-mail 
issues, you know, anything dealing with security: spyware, patches, things like that. All goes 
through the e-mail.”  Calvin supported this by saying, “Mainly [in] my job I e-mail. If we had a 
security issue that I think needs attention or their attention, I usually bring it to their attention by 
e-mail.” 
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 Training Programs 
Figure 2 shows the types of user awareness and training programs offered to users by 
ETSU and Milligan College.   
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At ETSU, classes are offered through the Academic Technology Support office. Jim said, 
“Through Academic Technology Support, we have offered courses in security awareness, in 
protecting yourself from viruses, spyware, things of that nature.”  This was supported by Ben 
who said, “Usually most of the training related to technology is handled through the Academic 
Technology Support group” and by Ray who said, “Personally this group doesn’t have a formal 
training. ATS/E-learning, formally they were part of OIT now they are under Academic Affairs, 
they have workshops that they schedule and offer.” When asked whether there were any training 
programs for faculty who used the multimedia classrooms, Fred said, “The official policy is they 
go to ATS. They are trained and then they are certified. They get like a key to the equipment 
cabinet and stuff like that.”  
Another course taught in conjunction with the Human Resources Office was discussed by 
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 Ray: 
I do a workshop for Human Resources twice a year. Well, it is titled: “Becoming Aware 
— Becoming IT Aware at ETSU”. Ah unfortunately we have more existing employees 
coming than new people (more are current, long-term employee rather than new hires) 
but it covers a very wide range of— from obtaining  to using computers at ETSU and we 
emphasize at that time safe computing practices. We share with them that information. 
Jim also said, “We have a website also that is designed to serve as training to people 
about security issues.” They also take advantage of one-on-one interactions with users to teach 
users safe computing behaviors, as expressed by Ray:   
And, as a group, we have people assigned to be responsible for certain areas on campus.  
They do a lot of one-on-one education. They will talk to the users. They will explain 
things in layman’s terms and emphasize to them safe computing behaviors, is what we 
like to call them, how to practice safe computing.  
Fred added:  
We do deal with users quite a bit. Used to be I was actually involved in training as well 
but now it’s a lot of times if the faculty—most of the faculty problems we get are faculty 
not knowing how to use the systems. So we go there and try to show them how to use it. 
But they have problems with installing software and stuff, so we do have a lot of face to 
face contact with faculty.   
Milligan College’s IT department also offers information technology courses regularly. 
Some courses are taught by Milligan faculty members. Allen said: 
Now throughout the course of the year each semester we provide classes that are taught 
by other professors, our help desk manager teaches some classes, things like that, on 
applications that they use. Okay and this is done as a group, volunteer to sign up. You 
know, if you want to come you can, if you can’t that’s fine. We usually try to do those 
monthly but it ended up more like quarterly, trying to get it scheduled, but we talk about 
things, you know, we talk about Outlook, using Outlook, you know, archiving your e-
mail, backing-up your machines. How to maintain your machines from spyware, 
malware, you know, things like that. So, you know, general things. Now we do do some 
departmental training too. That’s specific to software a particular would use. 
This was supported by Calvin: 
Our department as a whole has training programs every now and then we offer for faculty 
and staff on different security issues whether it’s e-mail scams or phishing or keeping 
their computer protected from viruses or spyware. Getting them to come is another matter 
but we do offer them every now and then.   
Computer use policies are also used to educate users. Allen said, “We do have a 
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 Computer Use Policy that all of our users consent to go by—just when—they acknowledge it 
when using the network. When they log on they are granting consent.”  Jim, from ETSU, said, 
“They are made aware of the policy, the main Acceptable Use Policy that they are agreeing to by 
using their account and that in turn tells them about security and proper procedures and some 
things.” 
 
New Employee Training.  In addition to its semiannual “Becoming IT Aware” workshop 
(see above), ETSU offers new employees minimal training in safe computing practices.  Jim 
explained:  
New employees have to go through the new employees’ orientation as part of the human 
resources—it is a requirement—and there is an IT component in there, where they are 
made aware of the resources available to them. There is nothing specifically about 
computer security there other than the fact they are made aware of the policy, the main 
Acceptable Use Policy that they are agreeing to by using their account and that in turn 
tells them about security and proper procedures and some things.  Not a lot of depth but it 
does start them down the path towards being aware. 
Milligan College offers no specific training for new employees but does offer courses 
throughout the year for anyone interested.  Allen said: 
We don’t really have anything scheduled as far as for new faculty or anything like that. 
Once we give them an e-mail login, network login, Angel login then they pretty much are 
on their own as far as that is concerned. Now throughout the course of the year each 
semester we provide classes that are taught by other professors, our help desk manager 
teaches some classes, things like that, on applications that they use. 
Calvin supported this by saying, “There is not [new employee training]. We talked about 
that in the past but we do not have any specific training when someone new comes in to—that 
they go through”; but, he added, “It’s a good idea.”  
 
Relaxed Attitude.  ETSU’s and Milligan’s training and awareness programs available for 
computer users appear to be totally optional in that even mandatory attendance policies are not 
enforced.  Fred noted: 
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 But yes, the official, the official policy is they go to ATS. They are trained and then they 
are certified. They get like a key to the equipment cabinet and stuff like that. But a lot of 
teachers fall through the cracks because we have classrooms all over campus so the 
teacher will teach there whether they have been trained or not. Sometimes they don’t 
know they have to go through training 
Ray noted a lack of interest on the part of ETSU’s faculty and staff. He said, “They 
[ATS/E-learning] have workshops that they schedule and they offer—participation is not as high 
as we would like.” Calvin indicated that the same was true at Milligan College. He said, “Our 
department as a whole has training programs, every now and then, we offer for faculty and staff 
on different security issues …. Getting them to come is another matter but we do offer them 
every now and then.”  Allen also said, “We usually try to do those monthly but it ended up more 
like quarterly, trying to get it scheduled.”   
 
Faculty and Staff Members’ Role in Securing Information Systems 
One open-ended question on the survey asked faculty and staff members to comment on 
the role they play in securing information systems.  Of the Milligan and ETSU faculty and staff 
members, 449 responded to the survey and 166 of the 449 responded to the open-ended question. 
The responses were assessed to answer Research Question 2: What are the faculty and staff 
members’ attitudes toward the role they play in securing computer systems as reported by the 
faculty and staff members? The responses provided an insight into what users state about their 
responsibilities and the challenges they face in securing information systems. Faculty and staff 
responses also revealed differences in awareness and practice levels among the participants.  
 
Authorized User’s Responsibility 
Overall, most of respondents indicated that they had some responsibility in securing 
computer systems. One participant said, “A computer system is no more secure than its least 
secure user” (P110). Another said, “It is a responsibility and not an option” (P337). One 
respondent from Milligan said: 
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 Because we are such a small school, I believe we all have a duty to follow security 
measures to the best of our ability.  Although I have never had formal training on our 
system, our IT dept. is always willing to answer questions and share updated information. 
(P32) 
Another from ETSU said: 
I understand the importance of securing not only student information but institutional 
information as well.  I know there are unethical people that would love to access our 
systems here at ETSU.  I pledge to always protect the information that I have access to 
and all the files I create through my job tasks. (P153) 
One participant commented on a lesson learned from a personal experience: 
I have learned much since my personal identity was stolen 2 years ago and take measures 
to ensure it never happens again.  I heavily rely on my computer to do my job and 
safeguard it as much as I can. (P207) 
Others discussed the role of users in general terms, emphasizing the vital role authorized 
users play in securing information systems. One said, “It's important to be consistent in 
protecting sensitive information. It only takes one [person] lax in security to compromise the 
entire system” (P165). Another expressed the same opinion, “The end user is one of the most 
important person in making sure passwords, systems security, etc. is continually updated and 
accessible to only that person” (P326). 
Others said: 
In any situation involving security, humans offer the greatest potential failure point.  This 
is true whether addressing physical security, security of classified information or 
computer security.  It is no accident that individuals, who are proficient in penetrating 
security systems, concentrate their efforts on humans.  In particular with regard to 
computer security, social engineering is the first method of choice.  Only through 
periodic training (retraining) can this weakness be reduced. (P113)  
As staff I believe we are the first line of defense in keeping security practices at the 
University.  We are very fortunate to have an IT person in our department who keeps us 
informed on these practices and reminds us of these frequently. (P146)  
Another said: 
 I feel I do my part in keeping my computer secured.  I never leave my computer 
unattended to where someone could use it without my knowledge.  My computer is 
usually locked when I am not using it.  Also, I can lock my door when I leave so 
therefore I feel like it is more secure than if it were in an open room or cubicle. (P17) 
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 Levels of Awareness and Computing Practices 
Faculty and staff members’ comments revealed differences in the level of awareness and 
comfort with technology among the participants. Four types of users emerged from the 
comments. The first group seemed to be technologically savvy. They seemed to be very aware of 
information security issues and diligently practiced safe computing behaviors. It appeared they 
could keep up with information security issues independently. They said the following: 
I typically back up files using at least three (3) different physical media (e.g., desktop 
HDD, USB drive (end of day), and back-up to a 2nd HDD (at 1:45 a.m.)). I also 
periodically make data back-up using CDs (740Mb) or DVDs (2Gbs) as "snapshots" in 
case of system or HDD failure. For personal and consulting work, I use E-mails that are 
digitally signed and sometimes encrypted.  When traveling (especially overseas) I do not 
take USBs or laptops that include confidential &/or proprietary data; hotel systems are 
proven sites for predatory industrial espionage and snooping. (P383) 
I think I have an obligation to myself and my department to be vigilant concerning 
computer security.  I also feel it is important to pass information on to everyone in my 
department concerning computer security to keep folks from being complacent or 
developing bad habits. (P242) 
The second group, the largest of the four, included people who took their responsibility 
seriously but needed help with keeping up with information security issues and technologies. 
They said they thought they were responsible and they did their best to protect information. 
Some indicated that they wanted to behave responsibly but were not prepared or educated to 
make the right choices. One said, “It is my responsibility to be sure my system is secure. If I 
cannot do it, I must call on our computer professional to help me do it” (P437).  Another said, 
“In my role, I am sure I am responsible.  I probably could use some training on making sure I 
take care of information responsibly” (P195).  Yet another said, “I try to follow the basic security 
precautions, but I am reliant on what other people tell me since I do not go and seek out 
information on my own” (P449). Others said: 
The role that I play in securing computer systems is to be aware of constant changes and 
be willing to learn. The role that the University plays is to deliver updates and 
information to employees to ensure awareness and compliance. (P196) 
I do what is necessary to make sure confidential information stored on my computer 
remains secure.  I feel I am a responsible computer user. (P389) 
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 I take security seriously, but I try not to be paranoid. (P44) 
It is difficult to keep up with computer technology and protection.  Because I am unsure 
about what the best practices are, I play it very safe ""at home"" and am very behind the 
times.  At work, I rely on OIT to take care of the computers, so I follow the rules to the 
best of my knowledge. (P367) 
I try to do my best to keep my computer and files as safe and secure as possible, but 
nothing is 100 percent guaranteed safe. 
I do what I am asked to do. (P23) 
I follow the directives that come through ETSU, including purchase of security software 
for my home computer. (P53) 
I am confident that I handle confidential material in accordance with this institution's 
policies.  I seldom log off or lock my computer during the work day because I lock my 
office door when I leave the office.  In my work environment, this seems to be sufficient 
for security purposes. (P82)   
The third group included people who used computer systems minimally or ignored the 
information security issue. One said, “I don't know anything about it, so I don't really worry 
about it until the problems on my computer are too big to ignore” (P18). Others said: 
I just do not use the computer instead of ""bothering"" people to find out if something is 
secure to do/perform or not to do/perform. I am too new to computers to fully utilize 
them to the full potential. Frequently I just turn the screen off on the moniter [sic] and 
leave the office for a short period of time. I have been told that the locking down of the 
computer is easily broken; so, I wonder what the use of even doing that is. (P309) 
It is sometimes difficult to remain current on the most up-to-date information. I 
sometimes get confused trying to understand all of the security issues, so I do not use the 
internet for banking. I have used it a few times to place orders, at Christmas time, over 
the internet, but prefer to call to place an order. I would like to do more financial 
transactions over the internet, but my lack of knowledge/confidence in computer systems 
makes me reluctant to use it. (P249) 
The last group included people who did not act responsibly. This group included people 
who seemed aware of how their actions could expose them to information security attacks. One 
said, “I am not very helpful in securing computer systems” (P265). Another said, “I rarely 
consider the role I play in securing computer systems; however, I do realize how wrong I am” 
(P414). Some said they thought security was the responsibility of IT departments. One 
participant said, “I depend on OIT to keep my computer safe as I am not computer savvy” (359). 
 68  
 
 
 Some indicated that convenience was more important. The rest of the comments were as follows: 
To be honest, computer security is not a topic that I think about.  I am aware of the issue 
and the challenges, but don't put my knowledge into practice when I use my computer.  
Unfortunately, too many times I view my computer like a file folder that I keep in my 
office.  With my paper folder, I do not secure my folder in a locked file cabinet.  In 
addition, I clearly label the file folder using a word that defines the content of the folder. 
My primary concern with my paper archives is immediate and easy access.  I feel the 
same way about my computer!  Access is of primary importance to me. (P333)  
While I am keenly aware of issues related to computer security, I must confess my 
knowledge does not always result in appropriate action.  Too often I delay performing 
tasks such as updating protection and backing up files. (P37) 
I am not good at dealing with these things.  I am admittedly too trusting. I don't feel I 
have time or energy to put into acting like I have to guard myself as if my identity and 
life could be stolen out from under me at any given moment. Perhaps I am foolish for 
feeling this way.  I do only part of what I need to do for security, and that's mostly so a 
virus won't kill my computer most of the time. (P229)   
It also appeared that some of these differences might be a result of users’ job functions. 
Participants who worked with confidential information such as student records or patient records 
or those who worked in IT indicated a strong sense of responsibility compared to those who did 
not usually work with confidential information. The following comments reveal these 
differences. One participant said, “I don't work with security items” (P185). Another who 
worked with student records said, “I have to keep my computer secured due to the amount of 
confidential records we have on students in our office” (P160). Another said, “I work in the 
College of Pharmacy; that was not an option” (P189). Others said, “I manage a number of 
campus computers in classrooms. I am vitally aware that security is essential” (P73), and:  
Keeping up with computer security is an ongoing in my profession as well as my 
personal life. I am careful at ETSU to follow recommendations from OIT and use the 
internet solely for internet and library searches, and e-mail. At home, I face many 
challenges as the parent of two teenagers. I monitor their use of the computer, their 
selection of usernames (It as a shock to me that my then 9 year old daughter had the 
username of 2hot41guy at one point), discuss with them almost daily the threats and 
possible misuse of computers, and attempt to educate their download and use of on-line 
games, programs, etc. (P203)   
My career prior to coming to ETSU was as an IT security manager in an electronics firm. 
I am a Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP). Information 
Security was and is my business. (P86) 
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 One indicated that conditions at work sometimes caused him or her to engage in unsafe 
computing behaviors, stating, “I think I understand the concepts of security, but in our 
department we have to cover for each other from time to time.  We are required to share 
password information and keep everything accessible to each other.” 
 
Role Models  
Some took their responsibility a step further. They indicated that it was also important to 
be a role model for others. One stated, “I think educated faculty need to be role models for others 
and encourage good practices” (P29). Another said, “By following good security practices 
myself, perhaps I will be an inspiration to others to do the same” (P157). Others said: 
As a supervisor I must set the example for the people who work with delicate and private 
information. If I don't exhibit my awareness for complete compliance with the measures 
in place, then my staff won't see the need either. (P223)   
Individuals should play a large part in keeping the whole system secure. We all need to 
follow the policies that are in place to protect the system, but I don't think that many 
people actually know what the policies are. (P176) 
 
Work Load  
Some participants indicated that they simply have too many responsibilities to pay 
attention to safe computing practices. These users depended on the IT department to protect 
them.  One said, “I try to keep up and help, but trying to get everything done sometimes results 
in forgetting to do the things that I should to keep information secure” (P215). Another said, 
“While I am keenly aware of issues related to computer security, I must confess my knowledge 
does not always result in appropriate action. Too often I delay performing tasks such as updating 
protection and backing up files” (P37).  Others said:   
I do not have the time to invest in studying security issues in-depth and rely quite heavily 
on the technology services at the University for the security of my work related files / 
issues.   I try to comply and hope I am remembering what I need to do to comply with the 
suggestions of OIT.  It is hard to remember all that may be necessary. (P311) 
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 Our students rely on clean secure files, especially in D2L based CMS and the instructors 
should be careful what they share on these platforms....the electronic workloads are ""lost 
time"", unremunerated and probably > 20 hrs a week off the clock after classroom and 
administrative work...administration is complicit in poor security as faculty are so tired 
they can easily fail to manage every aspect of eSecurity of files and systems. (P315) 
 
The Institution’s Responsibilities  
There were several comments about the institutions being responsible for educating users 
about information security issues and providing solutions. These comments came from ETSU 
participants. One user said, “Nearly all of my computer work is work-related. I rely on OIT for 
updates, ant-virus and other protections, and other information” (P66).  Another said, “I do not 
have the time to invest in studying security issues indepth and rely quite heavily on the 
technology services at the University for the security of my work related files or issues” (P311). 
Another said: 
The role that I play in securing computer systems is to be aware of constant changes and 
be willing to learn. The role that the University plays is to deliver updates and 
information to employees to ensure awareness and compliance. (P196) 
Some stated they thought that IT departments were very helpful in providing information 
and recourses. These said:   
ETSU OIT has been extremely helpful in teaching me how to backup and secure my 
work and computer. Having worked in other places without a strong IT department 
makes me appreciate them even more. It is my responsibility to be knowledgeable about 
protecting my computer and OIT helps me do it. (P80) 
I've never really thought about my role in securing computer systems, so I have no 
feelings about my role. I do have feelings about ETSU's role, and I believe the university 
has a responsibility to its users, which I believe it fulfills. (P96)  
Others said they felt their institutions and IT department could do more. One said, 
“Computers are hardly mentioned in new employee orientation. I feel that I could improve in my 
role.” (P173). Another said, “I believe we play an essential role and it would be very beneficial if 
ETSU could assist its employees with the education of maintaining reasonable levels (high) of 
information security” (P173) and another said, “I feel I need more education on securing 
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 computer systems. I am too ""trusting"" in what I do” (P262).  Others said: 
I wish the university would take a stronger institutional role in this area. Providing a 
means for easy back-ups and trainings to anyone who uses a computer to make sure they 
are following safe practices would be very helpful. My efforts to educate those in my 
department are sometimes dismissed and it would be better if the university were 
encouraging and training these practices, as well as providing a well-known means for 
backing up data. (P186) 
I tend to think that ETSU has been too loose with my own information. For months, the 
site for changing your password, which requires entering your SSN, was not secure; 
when you checked the locked sign at the lower right hand side you found that their 
security seal had expired. I got various and sundry answers as to why, including ""not a 
big deal, don't worry about it."" Suddenly the problem cleared up and they denied that 
there had ever been a problem when I called to check. C'est la vie. (P399) 
It would be helpful to have a person who would continually update us on what we need to 
be aware of as far as viruses go. I think OIT does some of that and they actually do a very 
good job of keeping us up and running at ETSU and yet it might be good to have info 
passed to us regularly about what not to open on e-mail or what to be watchful for.   
The amount of ""trash"" that gets transmitted through the university system is frightening 
to me and includes pornography which I really think the OIT department should be able 
to control for us. (P197) 
 
Specific Issues 
The comments revealed three other issues that were of concern to the participants: 
password management, phishing e-mails, and document management.  
 
Password Management.  Some respondents discussed the challenges they faced with 
password management. Several expressed the following sentiments regarding the challenge of 
remembering complex and multiple passwords: 
Password management is an ongoing problem issue. With the many distinct systems I 
interact with, having a unified password is not possible or desirable. As a result I have to 
keep track of multiple distinct passwords and logins. If passwords are all secure, 
remembering all of them and the systems they go with is problematic. I find that I have to 
use a secure program to store my login information in. I wish that other forms of 
authentication were more readily available so that I wouldn't have to remember all of this 
information. (P54) 
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 This issue of frequently changing passwords is an interesting one. I think that there is a 
serious tension between the mandate for frequent password changes and the injunction 
against writing down passwords. My observation is that when people are forced to 
change strong passwords frequently, they must write them down in order to remember 
them. My choice is to not write my passwords down, but I don't change them frequently. 
I have multiple strong passwords so that breaking one of these passwords would not 
compromise all of my logins. (P425) 
There is an inherent trade-off in password security. Strong passwords that are changed 
frequently are very difficult to remember. This results in more people writing them down, 
usually on notes in their desk drawer or attached to the computer, a practice that is 
completely insecure in a setting where others have physical access to the computer. 
Security protocols need to take into account the very real limits of actual human 
behavior. (P219) 
Passwords have become burdensome. I am forced to have complex passwords by dozens 
of different internet sites that I must work with on a daily basis. It is impossible to 
remember these and equally impossible to keep them totally secure. I review for over a 
dozen journals, for one example, each journal site has different passwords. And so on. 
When I stated that I write them down, I mean they are on my Outlook notebook, which I 
presume is secure, but who knows. (P104) 
One commented that recording passwords is not always a bad thing as long as they are 
secured: 
Recording passwords isn't inherently evil; it depends on how it's done. For example, I 
have a file on my BlackBerry that records user name and passwords that I rarely use (I'm 
not worried about those I use routinely, because they are memorized). The BlackBerry 
file is password protected; since it is a file containing sites my wife might need, she 
knows the password. Passwords for financial and other confidential systems should be 
different from those used to sign on to other sites (such as newspaper accounts).  (P440) 
One commented on the need to share passwords: “I think I understand the concepts of 
security, but in our department we have to cover for each other from time to time.  We are 
required to share password information and keep everything accessible to each other” (P343). 
 
Phishing E-mails. Some participants commented on their efforts to deal with phishing e-
mail. One said, “Whenever I get a phishing message, I usually send a message to OIT, so they 
can quickly alert ETSU users about the fraudulent e-mail” (P167). Another said, “I also DO 
NOT open any e-mail that I don't know who sent it” (P356). Others commented on how difficult 
it is to keep up. Those comments included:  
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 I believe it's important that I am aware of spam and phishing techniques so that I am not 
caught off-guard. But I also believe that as the spammers and phishers and hackers get 
increasingly sophisticated, I'm going to lag far behind in my knowledge of how to 
maintain security. (P135) 
I can easily fend off the older scams--Nigerian money laundering, Pay Pal/bank phishing-
-but new ones are always coming along. I try to weed them out, but since I receive 
legitimate e-mails from all over campus and across the nation, I feel vulnerable. 
Warnings from OIT are much appreciated. (P75) 
I wish there was a better system to keep all the junk mail out of our boxes.  I never open 
strange looking e-mail but sometimes it is hard to tell if it is or is not bad when you get 
all kinds of e-mail from potential students and you wouldn't know their name so you have 
to open it. (P239)  
 
Document Management and Other Issues. Others expressed concern about a lack of 
adequate protection for confidential information in some offices. They commented on the failure 
to secure hard copies of documents that contain confidential information. One questioned the 
necessity of providing social security numbers to pay parking tickets. Comments included: 
Security has never been an issue in our department, since we all have the same access.  
Printed material is the only concern.  I always make certain that I do not leave any 
confidential information at the copier.  However, if I find that someone has left 
something at the copier that should not be there, I either try to find the owner or place it 
in the shred bin. (P170) 
Being a part of a big system, I think my role along with everyone else's is extremely 
important. I don't think there is enough computer security related education given on 
campus. For instance, I don't think a lot of non-technical people even know how to (or 
that they should) lock their computer when away from their desk. Also, there is still way 
too much paper with secure info (like SS#s) floating around campus. I was actually asked 
for my SS# when paying a parking fine earlier this week. I offered my ID number but 
refused to give SS#. They were not happy. (P277) 
 
Usefulness of the Survey 
Some participants expressed that the survey for this study was helpful in raising their 
awareness. One said, “After reading this survey, I think I'll change my password!” (P416).  
Others said, “The questionnaire points out a few things I could do better!” (P360), “I simply 
hadn't thought about it before. I can see that changing my passwords, deleting unknown e-mails 
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 and making sure a website is secure can help out” (P295) and “I appreciate this survey.  Just 
taking it made me aware of what I might need to change about my behavior” (P247).  Another 
said: 
I know that the user is probably the weakest link in computer security. It depends on the 
user using safe practices. I try to be a safe user but there are some things that this survey 
made me aware of that I didn't know existed (ie. the Family Act and passwording specific 
documents). I will try to find out more about these when I have time.  
 
Quantitative Data Analysis 
The survey was completed by 449 respondents.  Of the respondents, 401 (89.3%) were 
from ETSU and 48 (10.7%) were from Milligan College. The survey was sent to all ETSU and 
Milligan employees with a university or college issued-e-mail account. At the time this survey 
was distributed, ETSU had 2,178 fulltime employees (ETSU Fact Book, 2007) and Milligan 
College had about 230 employees (Milligan College 2007-2008 catalog, 2007). Most 
respondents were fulltime staff (53%) and fulltime faculty (39.2%). Therefore, the return rate 
was approximately 19%. The highest responses came from the College of Medicine (17.6%). 
Most respondents were between 50 and 59 years old (37.7%). Table 2 presents detailed 
information about respondents’ positions, work units, and age.  
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 Table 2 
Demographics of the ETSU and Milligan College Participants 
Participants N %
Position:   
 Full-time faculty 176 39.2
  Adjunct faculty 11 2.4
  Full-time staff 238 53.0
  Part-time staff 6 1.3
 No Response 18 4.0
   
Work Unit:   
 Biblical, Humane, Social and Scientific Learning, Arts 
and Sciences 
 
68 15.1
  Business and Technology 47 10.5
  Education 53 11.8
  Medicine 79 17.6
  Nursing and Occupational Therapy 33 7.3
  Public and Allied Health 28 6.2
  Honors College, Continuing Studies, Graduate Studies, 
Student Affairs, Advancement, Health Sciences 
 
51 11.4
  Academic Affairs 30 6.7
  Business Affairs, Finance and Administration 31 6.9
 No Response 29 6.5
  
Age Range:   
 20-29 31 6.9
  30-39 83 18.5
  40-49 97 21.7
  50-59 169 37.7
  Over 60 68 15.1
 No Response  1 0.2
 
 
Overall, 43% of the respondents had been using computers for over 20 years and only 8% 
had been using computers for 5 years or less. Most reported that, on average, they spent 3 to 6 
hours per day on the computer at work and less than 2 hours on the Internet at work. Table 3 
shows the responses. 
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 Table 3 
Years of Computer Use, Daily Hours of On-campus Computer Use, and Daily Hours on the 
Internet 
Participants N %
Years of Computer Use:  
 1-5 years 8 1.8
  6-10 years 35 7.8
  11-15 years 95 21.2
  16-20 years 118 26.3
  over 20 years 193 43.0
  
Average Daily On-Campus 
 Computer Use (not on the  
Internet): 
 
 less than an hour 28 6.2
  1-2 hours 90 20.0
  3-4 hours 141 31.4
  5-6 hours 117 26.1
  7-8 hours 63 14.0
  more than 8 hours 10 2.2
  
Average Daily Hours Spent  
on the Internet (On-Campus): 
 
 less than an hour 164 36.5
  1-2 hours 189 42.1
  3-4 hours 62 13.8
  5-6 hours 24 5.3
  7-8 hours 7 1.6
  more than 8 hours 3 0.7
 
 
Research Question 3 
What are the faculty and staff members computing behaviors reported by the faculty and 
staff members that either protect or expose them or others to information security attacks?  
Descriptive statistics were used to describe ETSU and Milligan College faculty and staff 
members’ computing behaviors that either protect or expose them to information security 
attacks.   
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 Items 9 through 18 on the survey instrument measured awareness of information security 
issues and safe computing behaviors. The responses to these items were based on a four-point 
scale of (1) not aware, (2) somewhat unaware, (3) somewhat aware, and (4) aware. Table 4 
presents users’ responses to Items 9 through 18. 
 
 
Table 4 
Distribution of Awareness Responses  
 Not Aware Somewhat 
unaware
Somewhat 
aware 
Aware
 N % N % N % N %
Aware of the importance of securing 
passwords 
 
2 0.5 18
 
4.1 
 
420 95.5
  
Aware of the impact of responding to 
phishing e-mails 
 
4 0.9 39
 
8.8 
 
402 90.3
  
Aware of the need to update virus 
protection programs 1
 
0.2
 
8 1.8 41
 
9.2 
 
397 88.8
  
Aware of virus protection programs 1 0.2 4 0.9 53 11.9 389 87.0
  
Aware of the impact of viruses 8 1.8 63 14.1 377 84.2
  
Aware of the importance of backing 
up files 4
 
0.9
 
12 2.7 67
 
15.0 
 
365 81.5
  
Aware of vulnerabilities associated 
with sharing devices 11
 
2.4
 
24 5.4 98
 
22.0 
 
313 70.2
  
Aware of computer use policies 10 2.2 22 4.9 162 36.1 255 56.8
  
Aware that encryption can protect 
confidential information 26
 
5.8
 
38 8.5 98
 
22.0 
 
284 63.7
  
Aware of FERPA 95 21.2 55 12.3 107 23.9 191 42.6
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 Most respondents (75.6%) reported that they were aware of most of the awareness items. 
Most respondents stated that they were aware of the importance of securing passwords (95.5%), 
the impact of responding to phishing e-mails (90.3%), and the importance of backing up files 
(81.5%).  Seventy percent were aware of vulnerabilities associated with sharing storage devices. 
Most were aware of the impact viruses can have on computers (84.2%), anti-virus software 
(87%), and the importance of updating anti-virus software (88.8%).  A response of “not aware” 
was given by less than 6% on all of the awareness items, except one: awareness of FERPA, 
where 21% reported that they were not aware of FERPA requirements. This item had the lowest 
‘aware’ percentage (42.5%), compared to the other awareness items. 
Items 19 through 32 measured the practice of safe computing behaviors. The scale for 
these items, which indicated the frequency with which the respondents engaged in the stated 
behaviors, was (1) never, (2) almost never, (3) almost always, and (4) always. Table 5 shows the 
distribution of responses to the practice items.  
 
 
Table 5 
Distribution of Practice Responses  
 Never Almost 
never 
Almost 
always 
Always 
 N % N % N % N %
Have antivirus software on home 
computer(s) 13
 
3.0
 
11 2.6 66
 
15.3 
 
341 79.1
   
Checks the security of a website 
before making a financial transaction  12
 
2.7
 
24 5.4 102
 
23.1 
 
304 68.8
   
Shares password(s) with co-workers 274 61.9 132 29.8 274 6.1 10 2.3
   
Logs off after using a computer 
system 15
 
3.4
 
51 11.4 104
 
23.3 
 
277 62.0
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 Table 5 (continued) 
 Never Almost 
never 
Almost 
always 
Always 
 N % N % N % N %
Opens emails regardless of not 
knowing the sender’s identity  219
 
49.1
 
195 43.7 31
 
7.0 
 
1 0.2
   
Updates antivirus software on home 
computer  20
 
4.7
 
30 7.0 130
 
30.4 
 
248 57.9
   
Uses a combination of letters, 
numbers and special characters for 
passwords  38
 
 
8.5
 
 
79 17.7 117
 
 
26.2 
 
 
212 47.5
   
Allows programs to save usernames 
and passwords for faster access in the 
future  154
 
 
34.8
 
 
190 42.9 86
 
 
19.4 
 
 
13 2.9
   
Writes down password(s) 148 33.1 161 36.0 77 17.2 61 13.6
   
Back-up my files on reliable media 29 6.5 112 25.1 188 42.2 118 26.2
   
Install programs from the Internet on 
work computer 108
 
24.2
 
202 45.3 111
 
24.9 
 
25 5.6
   
Seek out information security 
information  54
 
12.2
 
154 34.8 145
 
32.7 
 
90 20.3
   
Logs off or lock computer before 
leaving desk 69
 
15.4
 
149 33.3 134
 
30.0 
 
95 21.3
   
Protects confidential files with 
passwords 90
 
20.4
 
128 29.0 108
 
24.5 
 
115 26.1
 
 
An average of 43.7% indicated that they always practice safe computing behaviors and an 
average of 31% indicated that they almost always practice safe computing behaviors. Most 
participants (79.1%) reported that they had antivirus software on their home computer. 
Approximately 58% stated that they always make sure their antivirus software is updated and 
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 30.4% reported that they almost always keep it updated. Approximately 68% always and 23.1% 
almost always verify that a website is secure before making a financial transaction. On the 
subject of passwords, only 47.5% reported that they always use a combination of letters, 
numbers, and special characters when selecting a password. About 26% stated they almost 
always use a combination of letters, numbers, and special characters for their passwords. Sixty-
nine percent indicated that they never or almost never write down their passwords, and 61.9% 
indicated that they never share their passwords with coworkers. Approximately 35% reported 
that they never and 42.9% reported that they almost never allow programs to save their 
usernames and passwords for faster access in the future.  
Almost half (48.8%) reported that they never or almost never log off or lock their 
computer before leaving their desks temporarily, and 62% reported that they always log off when 
they finish using their computers. Only 26.2% stated that they always back up their files on 
reliable media. Approximately 42% stated that they almost always back up their files. 
Approximately 68% reported that they never or almost never install programs on their work 
computers as they deemed necessary. Almost half (49.4%) indicated that they always or almost 
always protect confidential files with passwords. Forty-nine percent indicated that they never 
open e-mails sent by individuals they do not know. Fifty-three percent reported that they always 
seek information about information security. 
Most respondents (78%) reported that they change their passwords when asked to do so 
by the system and 7.3% report that they had used the same password for years. Only 7.6% 
reported that they change their password(s) every 3 months or less.  Of the respondents, 278 
(61.9%) had wireless internet connection at home and 71.6% of these indicated that their 
wireless connection was secured. Most respondents (76.8%) indicated that they shred unwanted 
confidential documents whereas 5.3% indicated that they put the documents in the trash.  
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Items 36 through 39 measured attitudes towards safe computing behaviors. The scale for 
these items was (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) agree, and (4) strongly disagree. Most 
respondents (97.1%) indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed that their actions as a user play 
 
 
 a part in securing computer system; 64% agreed that it was fairly easy to engage in secure 
information security practices and 23.6% strongly agreed. However, 42.9% of the respondents 
disagreed that it was easy to keep up with new developments related to information security 
whereas 41% agreed. In addition, 63.4% agreed or strongly agreed that they were reluctant to 
adapt new technologies until others around them had accepted them. The distribution of the 
attitudes responses are shown in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6 
Distribution of Attitude Responses 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 N % N % N % N % 
User actions affect security   2  0.4    8  1.8 248 55.6 188 42.2 
         
Following secure practices is easy   3  0.7  46 10.3 290 65.2 106 23.8 
         
Keeping up with new information 
security development is easy 
 
18 
 
  4.0 
 
191 
 
42.9 
 
184 
 
41.3 
 
 52 
 
11.7 
         
Reluctant to adapt new technologies 83 18.7 199 44.7 149 33.5  14   3.1 
 
 
Awareness, Practice, and Attitudes Scores 
Awareness, practice, and attitudes scores were computed to further analyze the data.  The 
awareness score was obtained by calculating the mean of the responses to Items 9 through 18 on 
the survey instrument. The practice score was obtained by calculating the mean of the responses 
from Items 19 through 32 and the attitude scores were obtained by calculating the mean of the 
responses for Items 36 through 39. Cases that did not have responses to all awareness items, all 
practice items, or all attitude items were omitted from the calculation. Table 7 shows the means 
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 and standard deviations for the scores. 
 
Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations for Awareness, Practice, and Attitudes Scores 
 Score N M SD 
Awareness 427 3.66 0.36 
    
Attitudes 439 2.83 0.36 
    
Practice 403 2.65 0.32 
 
 
Research Question 4 
In what ways, if any, do attitudes towards information security, awareness of information 
security issues, and awareness of information security policies make a difference in how faculty 
and staff members use information technology? 
H04: There is no relationship between information security attitudes score, information 
security awareness score, and information security practice score. Correlation coefficients were 
also computed to determine whether faculty and staff members who had positive attitudes toward 
information security were more aware of safe computing behaviors and also practiced safe 
computing.  The three correlations, as shown in Table 8, were significant at the .02 level, using 
Bonferroni method to control for Type 1 error across the correlations. Therefore, H04 was 
rejected. There was a strong positive correlation between awareness (M = 3.66, SD = 0.36) and 
practice (M = 2.65, SD = 0.32), a moderate correlation between attitudes (M = 2.83, SD = 0.36) 
and awareness, and a moderate correlation between attitudes and practice. The results indicated 
that those with more positive attitudes toward information security tended to be more aware of 
information security issues and tended to practice safe computing behaviors. 
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 Table 8 
Paired Samples Correlations Between Attitude, Awareness, and Practice   
Score 
 
Attitudes  
r 
Awareness 
r 
Awareness  .33a*  
    
Practice  .37b* .52c* 
Note. aN =418, bN = 395, cN = 385,  * p < .02 
 
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to identify differences between attitudes, 
awareness, and practice of safe computing behaviors. The test was significant at the .02 level, 
using Bonferroni method to control for Type 1 error across the three pairs. The results indicated 
that the mean awareness score (M = 3.66, SD = 0.36) was significantly greater than the mean 
practice score (M = 2.64, SD = 0.31), t(384) = 59.39, p < .01, η 2 = .90 . The mean awareness 
score (M = 3.66, SD = 0.36) was also significantly greater than the mean attitudes score (M = 
2.84, SD = 0.36), t(417) = 39.55, p < .01, η 2 = .78. The mean attitudes score was significantly 
greater than the mean practice score (M = 2.65, SD = 0.32), t(394) = 9.27, p < .01, η 2 < .17. 
Table 9 shows the results of the paired-samples t-test. 
 
Table 9 
Paired Samples t-test of Faculty and Staff Attitudes, Awareness, and Practice Scores 
Faculty and Staff N M SD T p 
95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Pair 1 Awareness 385 3.66 0.36 59.39 <.01 .98 to 1.04 
 Practice  2.64 0.31    
        
Pair 2 Attitudes 395 2.83 0.36 9.27 <.01 .14 to .22 
 Practice  2.65 0.32    
        
Pair 3 Awareness 418 3.66 0.36 39.55 <.01 .76 to .86 
 Attitudes  2.84 0.36    
Note. * p < .02 
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 Because internal consistency estimates of reliability for attitude did not indicate 
acceptable reliability, the results for the analysis based on the attitude score should be considered 
unreliable. However, the results from the awareness and practice scores are reliable and it can be 
concluded that the faculty and staff members appeared to be aware of information security issues 
and safe computing practices but did not always practice safe computing behaviors.  Figure 1 
displays the distribution of awareness, attitudes, and practice scores. 
 
 
 
PracticeAttitudesAwareness
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
Figure 3. Distribution of Awareness, Attitudes, and Practice Scores 
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 Research Question 5 
What differences, if any, exist in information security awareness and practice among 
faculty and staff members with different demographic characteristics? 
Ho51: There is no difference in information security awareness scores between faculty 
and staff at ETSU and faculty and staff at Milligan College. A two-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted to evaluate differences in awareness scores between faculty and staff 
members at ETSU and faculty and staff members at Milligan College. The ANOVA indicated no 
significant interaction between institution (ETSU or Milligan College) and position (faculty or 
staff), F(1, 405) = 0.15, p = .70, partial η 2 < .01. Also, there were no significant main effects for 
institution, F(1, 405) = 0.69, p = .41, partial η 2 < .01, and position, F(1, 405) = 0.03, p = .87, 
partial η 2 < .01.  
Ho52: There is no difference in information security practice scores between faculty and 
staff at ETSU and faculty and staff at Milligan College.  A two-way ANOVA was conducted to 
evaluate differences in practice scores between faculty and staff members at ETSU and faculty 
and staff members at Milligan College. There were no significant interaction for institution and 
position, F(1, 383) = 3.15, p = .70, partial η 2  < .01. Also, there were no significant main effects 
for institution, F(1, 383) = 0.04, p = .85, partial η 2 < .01, and position, F(1, 383) = 0.18, p = .66, 
partial η 2 = .01. The means and standard deviations for awareness and practice as a function of 
institution and position are presented in Table 10.  
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 Table 10 
Means and Standard Deviations for Awareness and Practice as a Function of Institution and 
Position 
Institution Position  Awareness  Practice  
  N M SD  N M SD 
ETSU Faculty 152 3.64 0.37  143 2.61 0.31 
  Staff 212 3.67 0.36  201 2.68 0.31 
         
Milligan College Faculty  27 3.71 0.34   25 2.69 0.31 
  Staff  18 3.69 0.38   18 2.57 0.43 
 
 
Ho53: There is no difference in information security awareness scores among those who 
were 20—29-years old, 30—39-years old, 40—49-years old, 50—59-years old, and over 60-
years old. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship between age and 
awareness of information security issues and safe computing practices. The factor variable, age, 
included five levels: 20—29-years old, 30—39-years old, 40—49-years old, 50—59-years old, 
and over 60 years-old. The dependent variable was the awareness score. The ANOVA was not 
significant, F(4, 421) = 1.07, p = .32, partial η 2 = .01. Therefore, Ho53 was retained.  
Ho54: There is no difference in information security practice scores among those who are 
20—29-years old, 30—39-years old, 40—49-years old, 50—59-years old, and over 60-years old. 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship between age and practice of safe 
computing behaviors. The dependent variable was the practice score. The ANOVA was not 
significant, F(4, 397) = 1.07, p = .38, partial η 2 = .01. Therefore, Ho54 was retained. The means 
and standard deviations for awareness and practice as a function of age are shown in Table 11. 
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 Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations for Awareness and Practice as a Function of Age 
Age   Awareness  Practice  
 M SD  M SD 
20—29 years old 3.59 0.07  2.62 0.06 
      
30—39 years old 3.61 0.04  2.60 0.04 
      
40—49 years old 3.69 0.04  2.69 0.03 
      
50—59 years old 3.66 0.03  2.65 0.03 
      
Over 60 years old 3.71 0.05  2.65 0.04 
 
 
Ho55: There is no difference in information security awareness scores among those who 
had 15 years or less, 16—20 years, and over 20 years of computer use. A one-way ANOVA was 
conducted to evaluate the relationship between years of computer use and awareness of 
information security issues and safe computing practices. The ANOVA was significant, F(2, 
418) = 9.45, p < .01, partial η2 = .04. Therefore, H55 was rejected. The effect size, as assessed by 
η2, was small, with years of computer use accounting for 4% of variance of the awareness scores.  
Because the overall F was significant, follow-up tests were conducted to evaluate 
pairwise differences among means of the three groups. The Dunnett’s C procedure was selected 
for multiple comparisons because equal variances were not assumed. There was a significant 
difference in means between the group that had used computers for over 20 years and the groups 
that had used computers for 16—20 years, and 15 years or less. However, there was no 
significant difference between the group that had used computers for 16—20 years and the group 
that had used computers for 15 years or less. The group that had used computers for over 20 
years tended to be more aware of information security issues and safe computing practices.  The 
95% confidence intervals, as well as means and standard deviations for awareness as a function 
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 of years of computer use, are reported in Table 12.  
 
 
Table 12 
Means and Standard Deviations With 95% Confidence Intervals of Awareness Pairwise 
Differences 
Years of Computer Use N M SD 15 years or less 16—20 years
15 years or less 126 3.57 0.42   
16—20 years  110 3.62 0.34 -.07 to .16  
Over 20 years 185 3.74 0.61 .65 to .27* .03 to .22* 
Note.* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level using Dunnett’s C procedure 
 
Ho56: There is no difference in information security practice scores among those who  
had 15 years or less, 16—20 years, and over 20 years of computer use. A one-way ANOVA was 
conducted to evaluate the relationship between years of computer use and practice of safe 
computing behaviors. The ANOVA was significant, F(2, 394) = 3.20, p < .04. Therefore, H56 
was rejected. The effect size, as assessed by η2, was small, with years of computer use 
accounting for 2% of variance of the practice scores.  
Because the overall F was significant, follow-up tests were conducted to evaluate 
pairwise differences among means of the three groups. The LSD procedure was selected for 
multiple comparisons because equal variances were assumed. The results indicated a significant 
difference in means between the groups. The group that had used computers for over 20 years 
practiced safe computing habits more than those who had used computers for 16—20 years and 
less than 15 years. The 95% confidence intervals, as well as means and standard deviations for 
practice as a function of years of computer use, are shown in Table 13.  
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 Table 13 
 Means and Standard Deviations With 95% Confidence Intervals of Practice Pairwise 
Differences 
 Years of Computer Use  N M SD 15 years or less 16-20 years 
15 years or less 116 2.61 0.35   
16—20 years 107 2.61 0.31 -.09 to .07  
Over 20 years 174 2.69 0.30 .002 to .15* .009 to .16* 
Note.* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level using the LSD procedure 
 
Ho57: There is no difference in awareness and practice scores among those who spent a 
daily average of 2 hours or less, 3—4 hours, 5—6 hours, and 7 or more hours on the computer 
(not on the Internet). A one-way multivariate analysis (MANOVA) was computed to determine 
whether there was a relationship between daily computer use (2 hours or less, 3—4 hours, 5—6 
hours, and 7 or more hours), and awareness and practice of safe computing behaviors. There 
were no significant differences among the four groups on the dependent variables, Wilks’s 
Lambda = .97, F(6, 712) = 1.58, p = .15, partial η2 = .01. Therefore, H57 was retained. Table 14 
shows the means and standard deviations on the dependent variables for the four groups.  
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 Table 14 
 Daily Computer Use Groups’ Awareness and Practice Means and Standard Deviations 
Daily Computer Use  N  Awareness  Practice 
   M SD  M SD 
2 hours or less  76  3.60 0.41  2.58 0.37 
        
3—4 hours  127  3.64 0.38  2.64 0.31 
        
5—6 hours  93  3.70 0.31  2.67 0.31 
        
7 or more hours 65  3.67 0.30  2.70 0.29 
 
 
Ho58: There is no difference in awareness and practice scores among those who spent a 
daily average of less than 1 hour, 1—2 hours, and 3 or more hours on the Internet. A one-way 
MANOVA was conducted to determine whether there was a relationship between daily Internet 
use (less than 1 hour, 1—2 hours, and 3 or more hours), and awareness and practice of safe 
computing behaviors. There were no significant differences among the three groups on the 
dependent variables, Wilks’s Lambda = .99, F(4, 762) = 1.40, p = .23, partial η2 < .01. Therefore, 
Ho58 was retained.  Table 15 shows the means and standard deviations on the dependent 
variables for the four groups.  
 
Table 15 
Daily Internet Use Groups’ Awareness and Practice Means and Standard Deviations 
Daily Internet Use  N  Awareness  Practice 
   M SD  M SD 
Less than 1  hour 139  3.65 0.37  2.62 0.32 
        
1—2  hours  167  3.63 0.36  2.65 0.31 
        
3 or more hours   79  3.72 0.34  2.69 0.35 
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 Summary  
Chapter 4 presented qualitative and quantitative analyses of interviews and survey data 
collected about ETSU and Milligan faculty and staff members’ computing behaviors. The 
analysis involved analyzing faculty and staff members’ computing behaviors as perceived by IT 
professionals and by the faculty and staff themselves.  
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 CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The purpose of the study was to explore perceived faculty and staff members’ behaviors 
that either protect or expose them to information security attacks. The study explored ETSU and 
Milligan College faculty and staff members’ computing behaviors. Data collected from 
interviews with IT professionals and an online survey were analyzed to understand the faculty 
and staff members’ computing behaviors.  This chapter concludes the research. It summarizes 
findings and conclusions, recommendations for practice, and recommendations for future 
research.  
 
Findings Related to the Study’s Five Research Questions  
Research Question 1 
What are the computing behaviors of faculty and staff members that either protect or 
expose them or others to information security attacks as observed by information technology 
professionals? 
The IT professionals who participated in this study reported that password 
mismanagement was the major problem they encountered with authorized users. They stated that 
faculty and staff members often shared their passwords with colleagues and student workers. 
They reported that faculty and staff members tended to write down their passwords and to 
choose weak passwords. They also reported that some authorized users did not always log off 
their computers. Some participants attributed these behaviors to users’ lax attitudes towards 
information security and lack of understanding of the impact of their behaviors.  One IT 
professional stated that users tend to write down passwords that are too complex to remember. 
IT professionals said they believed that faculty and staff members routinely fail to secure 
the contents of their portable storage devices such as USB flash drives. Even though users may 
be aware of these device’s vulnerabilities, they did not know how to secure them, and encryption 
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 was not yet seen as a feasible strategy for securing data. ETSU plans to invest in data encryption 
products in the future. In the meantime, ETSU IT professionals recommended discouraging 
faculty and staff members from storing confidential information on portable storage devices.  
Some also reported that they had seen hard copies of confidential documents placed in plain 
sight for anyone to observe.  
ETSU IT participants said they believed that most users used a shredder or confidential 
document disposal bins in some ETSU offices to dispose of sensitive documents. However, it 
seemed there were no institution-wide policies addressing this issue.  
Both institutions provide users with storage on campus servers and do frequent backups 
on these servers. However, participants reported incidents of permanent data loss because of 
accidental data deletion or equipment failure involving data that were neither stored on network 
servers nor backed-up. In general, faculty and staff members appeared to use their server space 
for storage.   
ETSU and Milligan IT professionals reported that they rely on special applications rather 
than user vigilance to manage malware. However, they also noted that faculty and staff members 
were aware of the impact of malware. 
Participants reported that phishing e-mails were concerns. They said they believed that 
users were generally aware of the threat and tended not to reply to phishing e-mails. The ETSU 
and Milligan IT departments use filtering software to screen incoming e-mail. This software 
prevented most, but not all, phishing attempts from reaching users’ inboxes. Phishing techniques, 
however, were becoming more sophisticated, and some people were falling victim to these 
attempts. IT professionals reported that they tried to educate users to recognize phishing e-mails 
and alert users to especially insidious phishing attempts that evade the filters.   
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Participants expressed concerns about the violation of ethics of computing by some 
faculty and staff members, although that was not the study’s focus. They stated that FERPA 
compliance was a management issue and the Registrar’s Office was responsible for enforcing 
FERPA. 
 
 
 It appeared that the consensus among the IT professionals was that even though faculty 
and staff were aware of information security issues, they tended not to practice safe computing 
behaviors until an unfortunate incident occurred. Unfortunate events that were close to home 
tended to shake users into practicing safe computing behaviors. 
The main point of disagreement between ETSU’s and Milligan’s IT professionals 
involved the granting of administrative privileges to faculty and staff members. ETSU 
participants, unlike Milligan participants, were in favor of limiting privileges for faculty and staff 
members to those who needed them. This difference might be because Milligan is a small college 
where the IT personnel have the advantage of knowing every faculty and staff member. ETSU, 
on the other hand, has over 2,000 employees and it is difficult for ETSU IT personnel to know all 
of them personally. Also, Milligan, as a private and religious college, is free to enforce a stricter 
code of conduct than is ETSU. 
Neither ETSU nor Milligan offered an intensive orientation in information security for 
new employees, although they made these employees aware of the institutions’ computing 
policies. However, both institutions regularly offered voluntary information security training and 
used several modes of communication to inform users about information security issues.  
 
Research Question 2 
What are the faculty and staff members’ attitudes toward the role they play in securing 
computer systems as reported by the faculty and staff members? 
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ETSU and Milligan faculty and staff members tend to perceive that their computing 
behaviors could have an impact on the security of computer systems. Most reported that they had 
a responsibility in securing computer systems. It appears there were four groups of users at 
ETSU and Milligan College. The first group indicated that they were very aware of information 
security issues and made every effort to practice safe computing behaviors. The second group 
indicated that they understood their responsibilities and information security issues and were 
willing to practice safe computing behaviors but needed more education to do that. The third 
 
 
 were aware of their responsibilities and understood information security issues but did not take 
that responsibility seriously or they simply did not care. They put all the responsibility on the IT 
departments. Some stated that they had too many responsibilities to focus on safe computing 
behaviors and relied on IT for computer security. The fourth avoided using computers as much 
as possible because they did not like using computers or because they simply did not think they 
were equipped to use computers securely.  
Some assumed responsibility for acting as role models and for educating others about 
secure computing. Most users stated that their IT departments played a major role in securing 
computer systems. The IT responsibilities included educating users and providing technical 
solutions.  
Users discussed password management, phishing e-mails, and document management in 
their observations about secure computing practices. They tended to agree that managing 
passwords was a challenge for them. They indicated that it was challenging to remember 
complex passwords, especially multiple complex passwords. One user argued that there was an 
occasional need to share passwords because of the nature of work. Users stated that they were 
diligent about fending off phishing attempts. Some stated that they did not open suspicious e-
mails. However, users also acknowledged that it was becoming difficult to distinguish some 
phishing e-mails. In those cases, some notified their IT departments. Some users expressed 
concern that hard copies of confidential information were not adequately protected in some 
offices. In some instances, confidential information was available to those who did not need it to 
perform their duties. Finally, some reported that participating in this study helped them recognize 
some computing behaviors they needed to correct.    
 
Research Question 3 
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What are the faculty and staff members’ computing behaviors that either protect or 
expose them or others to information security attacks as reported by the faculty and staff 
members? 
 
 
 Most ETSU and Milligan faculty and staff members (75.6%) indicated that they were 
aware of information security related issues. However, only 42.6% reported that they were aware 
of the FERPA requirements; 21.2% reported that they were not aware of FERPA requirements. 
Only 56.8% were aware of computer use policies at their institutions although 36% indicated that 
they were somewhat aware of the policies.  
An average of 43.7% indicated that they always practiced safe computing behaviors and 
an average of 31% indicated that they almost always practiced safe computing behaviors. Most 
respondents (78%) reported that they change their passwords when asked to do so by the system 
and only 7.6% reported that they change their password(s) every 3 months or less. Most (71.6%) 
of those who had wireless Internet connection at home reported that their wireless connection 
was secured. Most respondents (76.8%) also indicated that they shredded unwanted confidential 
documents.  
 
Research Question 4 
In what ways, if any, do attitudes towards information security, awareness of potential 
information security issues, and awareness of information security policies make a difference in 
how faculty and staff members use information technology?  
The results from a paired-samples t-test showed that the faculty and staff members’ 
awareness of safe computing behaviors exceeded the extent to which they practiced those 
behaviors. Significant positive correlations were observed between attitudes, awareness, and 
practice of safe computing behaviors. The correlation between attitude and awareness together 
with the correlation between attitude and practice is not reliable because the instrument review 
failed to establish this aspect of the instrument’s reliability. Nonetheless, the results showed that 
the more aware the faculty and staff members were, the more they practiced safe computing 
behaviors. 
 
 97  
 
 
 Research Question 5 
What differences, if any, exist in information security awareness and practice among 
faculty and staff members with different demographic characteristics?  
The analysis of the data indicated that there were no significant differences in awareness 
of information security issues between faculty and staff members at ETSU and Milligan College. 
The computing behaviors of ETSU faculty and staff and the computing behaviors of Milligan 
faculty and staff members were similar. Also, the computing behaviors of ETSU and Milligan 
faculty members were similar to the computing behaviors of ETSU and Milligan staff members.  
There were no significant differences in awareness of information security issues and 
practices among the five age groups (20—29-years old, 30—39-years old, 40—49-years old, 
50—59-years old, and over 60-years old). Also, there were no significant differences in safe 
computing practices among these age groups.  
The results indicated that faculty and staff members who had used computers for over 20 
years tended to be more aware of information security issues and tended to practice safer 
computing behaviors than did those who had used computers for 20 years or less.  However, 
there was no relationship between average daily computer use (2 hours or less, 3—4 hours, 5—6 
hours, and 7 or more hours) and awareness and practice of safe computing behaviors. Also, there 
were no significant differences in awareness of information security issues and practice of safe 
computing habits among those who spent less than 1 hour, 1-2 hours, and 3 or more hours on the 
Internet.  
 
Findings in Relation to Literature Review 
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This study indicated that faculty and staff members at the two participating institutions 
were aware of information security issues and safe computing practices. The findings support 
what was found by Aytes and Connoly (2004) and Furnel (2005). However, the faculty and staff 
did not always practice safe computing behaviors as much as they were aware of information 
security issues and safe computing behaviors.  
 
 
 Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), Davis (1986), and Dillon and Morris (1996) argued that 
attitudes towards a behavior influences a person’s behaviors. The results from this study 
indicated that this seemed to be the case with ETSU and Milligan faculty and staff members. 
However, the results were not reliable because the internal consistency of the attitude measure 
was unacceptable.  
In 2003, the University of Pennsylvania identified weak passwords as the most 
significant threat to the security of its computer systems (Foster, 2004). ETSU conducted a 
similar evaluation and found that this was true for ETSU as well. Consequently, ETSU 
implemented a complex password policy. 
The literature review identified a study from 2006 that found users were not aware of the 
need to secure wireless connections (Barile).  This study determined that most faculty and staff 
members at ETSU and Milligan College had secured their wireless connection at home.  
Ashe (2004) and Simons (2005) indicated that ETSU’s tolerance for decentralized 
management of information resources helped to create situations where systems were managed 
by users who failed to properly secure their systems. This situation seems to persist at ETSU and 
Milligan because faculty and staff members had administrative privileges on their office 
computers. ETSU and Milligan also seem to have no standard policies for disposing of sensitive 
documents, although ETSU was working on a policy to manage portable devices.  
Best practices in institutional computer security include instituting and enforcing 
information security policies and training users to practice safe computing behaviors (Anderson, 
2001; Bishop, 2005; Camp et al., 2007; Canavan, 2001; Conklin et al., 2004).  ETSU and 
Milligan College have information security policies, but failed to enforce them consistently. 
They also offer training programs, although they were voluntary.  
 
Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be drawn from these findings: 
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 1. ETSU and Milligan faculty and staff members are aware of information security 
issues and safe computing practices although they do not always practice safe 
computing behaviors to the same extent as they are aware.    
2. There were no significant differences between faculty and staff members with 
different demographic characteristics except for years of computer use. Those who 
had used computers for more than 20 years were significantly more aware of 
information security issues and practiced safe computing behaviors more than those 
who had used computers for fewer years. 
3. Password management continues to challenge users and IT departments. 
4. Security applications such as antivirus programs have been instrumental in managing 
malware risks.  
5. Faculty and staff members have learned to deal with phishing e-mails. However, 
phishing attempts continued to be a challenge as the creators were becoming more 
sophisticated in their attempts.  
6. Both institutions have training programs but attendance was not required. The 
majority of faculty and staff members would like to have more training and support 
from their IT departments. 
7. Although FERPA was one of the major acts that govern the protection of students’ 
records, faculty and staff at ETSU and Milligan appear to be unaware of FERPA 
guidelines.   
8. IT professionals were concerned with unethical and illegal behaviors that some users 
engaged in while using ETSU and Milligan College information resources.  
 
Recommendations for Practice  
 The following are recommendations for administrators and IT professionals based on the 
findings of this study:  
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1. The complex password policy recently instituted at ETSU should be commended. The 
 
 
 only suggestion I can offer is that more instructions should be available to guide users 
in selecting passwords that are complex but also easy to remember, thereby removing 
the need to write them down.  
2. The findings revealed that there currently is no intensive information security training 
for new employees. It will be worthwhile to offer a new employee orientation that 
focuses on introducing new employees to information security resources available for 
them. Intensive information security training should be considered for employees 
who work with sensitive information.  
3. ETSU was in the process of exploring ways to manage portable devices. That process 
should continue.  Milligan, as well, should explore this process.  
4. Faculty and staff members are encouraged not to store confidential information on 
portable devices unless the data on the device are encrypted.  
5. Faculty and staff members should be encouraged to take time to read their 
institution’s computer use polices. 
6. Faculty and staff members should be encouraged to take time to read the FERPA 
guidelines.  
 
Recommendations for Further Research 
The following recommendations for further research are based on the findings of this study. 
1. A study should be extended to include other institutions of different sizes and in 
different parts of the country and world.  
2. A more extensive qualitative study should be conducted to understand the disparities 
between awareness and practice and also to understand faculty and staff attitudes 
towards the practice of safe computing behaviors.  
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3. This study determined that there were significant differences between faculty and 
staff members who had used computers for over 20 years and those who had used 
computers for 20 years or less. The Internet and personal computers became popular 
 
 
 4. There is need to develop a quantitative instrument that measures attitudes towards 
information security that can be used to assess the impact of attitudes on secure 
computing behaviors.  
5. A study of faculty and staff members’ attitudes towards ethics of computing would be 
informative. The study could provide information to help IT professionals and 
administrators address the ethical and legal concerns raised in this study. 
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 APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Interview Guide 
 
1. How long have you worked in this Department? 
2. How do you keep users informed about information security issues? 
3. What kind of training programs do you offer to faculty and staff members to help 
them use information technology securely?  
4. From your experience, what are the computing behaviors of faculty and staff at your 
institution that either expose or protect them from information security attacks, 
especially in the following areas? 
a. Password management 
b. Data storage devices and document management 
c. Data back-up management 
d. Knowledge of Federal and State information security laws - FERPA 
e. Defense against malware 
f. Defense against phishing email 
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 APPENDIX B 
Information Security Survey Instrument  
 
Demographic Information 
 
1. Please select your institution 
Ο East Tennessee State University 
Ο Milligan College 
 
2. Please indicate your gender 
 Ο Female 
 Ο Male  
 
3. Please select the range that reflect your current age 
Ο below 20 
Ο 20 – 24 
Ο 25 – 29 
Ο 30 – 34  
Ο 35 – 39 
Ο 40 – 44  
Ο 45 – 49  
Ο 50 – 54  
Ο 55 – 59 
Ο 60 – 64  
Ο over 64  
 
4. Please select the range that best indicate the number of years you have used computers 
Ο less than 1 year 
Ο 1 – 5 years 
Ο 6 – 10 years 
Ο 11 – 15 years 
Ο 16 – 20 years 
Ο over 20 years  
 
5. Please indicate your current job classification 
Ο Full-time faculty  
Ο Adjunct faculty 
Ο Full-time staff  
Ο Part-time staff 
Ο Other 
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 6. In which college or unit do you work? 
 
ETSU 
Ο Arts and Sciences 
Ο Business and Technology 
Ο Education  
Ο Medicine  
Ο Nursing 
Ο Public and Allied Health 
Ο Honors College 
Ο School of Continuing Studies 
Ο School of Graduate Studies 
Ο Academic Affairs 
Ο Finance and Administration 
Ο Health Sciences 
Ο Student Affairs 
Ο University Advancement  
 
Milligan College  
Ο Biblical Learning  
Ο Business 
Ο Education 
Ο Humane Learning  
Ο Nursing 
Ο Occupational Therapy 
Ο Performing, Visual, and Communicative Arts  
Ο Scientific Learning 
O Social Learning  
 
  
On-campus computer use  
 
7. Please select a range that best indicates your average daily hours of on-campus computer use 
(not on the Internet) 
Ο less than 1 hour 
Ο 1 – 2 hours 
Ο 3 – 4 hours  
Ο 5 – 6 hours  
Ο 7 – 8 hours 
Ο more than 8 hours 
 
8. Please select a range that best indicates your average daily hours you spend on the Internet 
on-campus  
Ο less than 1 hour 
Ο 1 – 2 hours 
Ο 3 – 4 hours  
Ο 5 – 6 hours  
Ο 7 – 8 hours 
Ο more than 8 hours 
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 Please answer the following questions according to your computer use at work, unless 
otherwise specified.  
 
Information Security Awareness 
 
With respect to information technology 
and its security, I am aware…  
 
not 
aware
somewhat 
unaware  
somewhat 
aware  
 
aware 
9. of the requirements and 
expectations of the computer use 
policies at my institution. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
10. of the impact that a virus can have 
on my computer system.   
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
11. that virus protection software can 
identify and remove viruses. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
12. that virus protection software 
requires frequent updates.  
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
13. that I should keep my passwords 
secure. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
14. of the requirements of the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA). 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
15. of the impact of responding to 
phishing emails (e.g. unsolicited 
emails asking for your bank 
information).  
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
16. that it is important to back-up my 
files  
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
17. that encryption can prevent 
unauthorized access to 
confidential information. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
18. of the vulnerabilities associated 
with sharing devices such as files 
and drives. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
 
Information Security Practice 
 
 
To what extent do you do the following: 
 never
almost 
never 
almost 
always  always 
19. I log off or lock my computer before 
I step away from my desk? 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
20. I log off when I finish using a 
computer system. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
21. When choosing a password, I use a Ο Ο Ο Ο 
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To what extent do you do the following: 
 never
almost 
never 
almost 
always  always 
combination of letters, numbers and 
special characters. 
22. I write down my password(s). Ο Ο Ο Ο 
23. I share my password(s) with my co-
workers. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
24. I back-up my files on reliable media. Ο Ο Ο Ο 
25. I have antivirus software on my 
home computer(s). 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
26. I keep the antivirus software on my 
home computer updated. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
27. I allow programs to save my 
usernames and passwords for faster 
access in the future. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
28. I download and install programs 
from the internet as I deem necessary 
on my work computer. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
29. I protect confidential files with 
passwords. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
30. I check whether a website is secure 
or not before making a financial 
transaction over the internet.  
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
31. I seek out information about 
information security  
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
32. I open emails regardless of not 
knowing the sender’s identity 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
 
33. My wireless Internet connection at home is 
Ο secured 
Ο not secured 
Ο I don’t know  
Ο I don’t have wireless connection  
 
34. I change my password(s)  
Ο when I am asked to (by the system)  
Ο every month 
Ο every three months or less 
Ο every six months or less 
Ο Every 12 months or less 
Ο I have used the same password(s) for years 
 
35. When disposing confidential documents such as an official class roster 
Ο I usually place them in the trashcan. 
Ο I usually tear up the documents and place them in the trashcan.  
Ο I usually use a shredder.
 
 
  
Attitude towards Information Security Awareness and Practice 
 
With respect to information 
technology and its security, … 
 
strongly 
disagree disagree agree 
 
strongly 
agree 
36. I think it is fairly easy to 
follow secure information 
security practices.   
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
37. I believe my actions as a user 
play a part in securing 
computer systems.  
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
38. I find it easy to keep up with 
new developments related to 
information security.  
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
39. I am reluctant to adapt new 
technologies until I see the 
majority of the people around 
me accept them. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο 
 
40. In the space below, write a few comments about your feelings about the role you play in 
securing computer systems.  
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 APPENDIX C 
Informed Consent Document  
EAST TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY 
VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTER 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT (ICD)  
FOR PROSPECTIVE RESEARCH INTENDED FOR REVIEW 
 
 
This Informed Consent will explain about being a participant in a research study. It is important 
that you read this material carefully and then decide if you wish to be a volunteer. 
 
PURPOSE:   
 
This study is dissertation study required to complete my doctorate degree. The objective of this 
study is to identify faculty and staff habits that make academic institutions either more or less 
vulnerable to information security attacks. 
  
DURATION  
 
It will take 30 - 60 minutes of your time to complete the interview.  
  
PROCEDURES    
 
I will ask you questions regarding information security. The interview will be recorded and I will 
also take notes during the course of the interview.  
 
ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES/TREATMENTS   
 
There are no alternative procedures except not to participate. 
 
POSSIBLE RISKS/DISCOMFORTS      
 
There are no foreseeable risks associated with this study.   
 
POSSIBLE BENEFITS   
 
The results of the study may provide useful information that you can use to help faculty and 
staff use computers securely. 
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION   
 
Participation in this research experiment is voluntary.  You may refuse to participate.  You can 
quit at any time.  If you quit or refuse to participate, the benefits to which you are otherwise 
entitled will not be affected.  You may quit by calling me, Chiwaraidzo Judith Nyabando, at 
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 (423) 433-3459.  You will be told immediately if any of the results of the study should 
reasonably be expected to make you change your mind about staying in the study.  
   
CONTACT FOR QUESTIONS   
 
If you have any questions, problems or research-related medical problems at any time, you may 
call me, Chiwaraidzo Judith Nyabando, at (423) 433-3459, or Dr. Jasmine Renner at (423) 439-
7629.  You may call the Chairman of the Institutional Review Board at (423) 439-6054 for any 
questions you may have about your rights as a research subject.  If you have any questions or 
concerns about the research and want to talk to someone independent of the research team or 
you can’t reach the study staff, you may call an IRB Coordinator at (423) 439-6055 or (423) 
439-6002. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY     
 
Every attempt will be made to see that your study results are kept confidential.  A copy of the 
records from this study will be stored in Warf-Pickel, room 501 for at least 5 years after the end 
of this research.  The results of this study may be published and/or presented at meetings 
without naming you as a subject.  Although your rights and privacy will be maintained, the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, ETSU, and personnel particular to 
this research, members of my dissertation committee have access to the study records.  Your 
records will be kept completely confidential according to current legal requirements.  They will 
not be revealed unless required by law, or as noted above. 
 
By signing below, you confirm that you have read or had this document read to you.  You will 
be given a signed copy of this informed consent document.  You have been given the chance to 
ask questions and to discuss your participation with the investigator.  You freely and voluntarily 
choose to be in this research project. 
 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT          DATE 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
PRINTED NAME OF PARTICIPANT           DATE 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR                 DATE 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS (if applicable)                DATE 
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 APPENDIX D 
Contact Letter 
Dear Participant: 
 
My name is Judith Nyabando and I am a graduate student at East Tennessee State University. I 
am working in my doctorate degree in Educational Leadership and Policy Analysis. I am in the 
process of writing my dissertation.  The name of my study is ‘An Analysis of Perceived Faculty 
and Staff Habits that Protect or Expose them or Others to information Security Attacks.’ 
 
I would like to give a brief survey questionnaire to you. It should only take about 10 minutes to 
complete. You will be asked questions about your awareness of information security issues. 
There are no risks associated with you taking the survey.  
 
To take the survey click on the link below: 
http://www.etsu.edu/coe/UltimateSurvey/takeSurvey.asp?surveyID=64 
 
This process is completely anonymous and confidential. In other words, there will be no way to 
connect your name with your responses. You will not be asked to provide any identifying 
information about yourself such as name and date of birth.  
 
If you choose not to complete the survey, it will not affect you in any way.  
 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate. You can quit at any time 
by not submitting the survey.   
 
If you have any research-related questions, you may contact me at (423) 433-3459 or my 
committee chair, Dr. Jasmine Renner at (423) 439-7629. Also the, the chairperson of the 
Institutional Review Board at East Tennessee State University is available at (423) 439-6055 if 
you have questions about your rights as a research subject. If you have any questions or you 
can’t reach the study staff, you may call an IRB Coordinator at (423) 439-6055 or (423) 439-
6002. 
 
Sincerely  
 
 
C. Judith Nyabando    
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